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This paper aims to sound two alarms. First, about “them.” We Americans have long assumed non-
Asian non-Westerners are more primitive, less advanced, and ultimately less capable than we are.  This 
is a mistaken view.  Not only are many much more sophisticated than we realize, but they are 
especially adept in the realm of social relations, which has never been our strong suit. 
 
Consequently, one challenge we face is that in much the same way our technological prowess led the 
Soviets to overreach (and thus the Soviet Union to collapse), non-Westerners’ ability to outmaneuver us 
in the field of social relations will lead us to continue to overextend ourselves.  And worse, we won’t 
achieve clear wins. In writing this I do not mean to imply that our overreach will be purposely 
orchestrated by any one actor or set of actors, although that remains a distinct possibility.  Rather, 
people abroad (and here at home, working on behalf of people abroad) will continue to seek U.S. 
military assistance for a host of reasons, both venal and legitimate, and the effects will continue to be 
cumulatively corrosive. Just look at our current culture of war—which brings me to the second source 
of alarm: us. 
 
Our technical ingenuity, our work ethic, and our productive capacity have long distinguished us. 
Engineering, one could say, is our forte. We Americans make things work.1   All of which would appear 
to stand our military in good stead.  And indeed, until recently, our ‘can do’, problem-solving 
professionalism did advantage us.  However, no longer.  I  write ‘no longer’ because we no longer seem 
to want to apply our comparative strengths definitively.  At the same time, ‘can do’ overstates what we 
can accomplish. 
 
It seems a foregone conclusion that we will continue to excel technologically.  No one is likely to 
surpass us in the realms of technological inventiveness or organizational innovation so long as we 
continue to apply the scientific method to problem solving.  However, in the realm of what humans can 
do with and to other humans we are being outstripped. Morally, we shouldn’t want to compete in this 
terrain, but the problem is we will be competed against.  Already, there are some developments—like 
suicide terrorism and “green on blue” violence – for which we are unlikely to develop sufficient 
counters. The implications are profound for what U.S. forces might have to contend with in the field 
and cope with mentally. 
 
Political correctness and self-censorship deserve some, but not all of the blame for why no one 
addresses the societal sources of others’ inhumanity. Since the advent of anthropology, the mainstream 
social science view has been that we humans are more alike than unalike cross-culturally; differences 
can all be overcome.  But—what if that isn’t the case? For the purposes of this paper my working 
assumption will be that we aren’t all wired with the same sensibilities. At the same time, the more the 
world shrinks the more our status vis-à-vis one another will matter. 
 
People(s) typically seek to alter their status in the eyes of others in one of four ways: a) they seek 
autonomy, which means they want to be left alone, b) they seek respect, which means they want to be 
treated as different but not lesser, c) they seek deference, which means they want to be treated as more 
equal than others, or d) they expect others to submit, which means they seek obeisance.  Islamists, for 
instance, still seek our submission.  In contrast, over time the USSR proved willing to accept obeisance 
from Eastern Europe and settled for deference from the United States. 
 
More important than where exactly anyone might fall on such a scale is what happens when aspirations 
are immutable.2   Then the motivation for fighting might ebb and flow, but the impetus behind it won’t 
die away.  This makes certain kinds of cross-cultural clashes much more dangerous than others, and the 
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side that doesn’t want to submit had better inflict a definitive defeat on the side seeking its submission. 
Nor will simply declaring victory suffice.  The side that is defeated needs to be made to disarm. 
 
Unfortunately, inflicting searing defeats on others has grown increasingly difficult since WWII. One 
can point to three interlocking sets of reasons: 1) our sensibilities, 2) their methods, and 3) the fact that 
others will adjust their methods to our sensibilities in increasingly sophisticated ways.  Insurgents 
everywhere, for example, purposely burrow into populations, which makes it next to impossible for a 
military such as ours, that doesn’t want to cause widespread collateral damage, to root them out. Also, 
because al-Qaeda (AQ)—our only declared foe—has done none of the things people feared it might 
(such as orchestrate further attacks inside the U.S.), decision makers have not had to wrestle with what 
it would take to have to inflict an unmistakably searing defeat on an adversary. Decision makers have 
instead been able to kick the can down the road on what constitutes ‘winning.’3   That represents one 
problem. A second is that conditions hardly remain static and one can identify at least five ongoing 
shifts that have the potential to irreparably subvert our way of war. These are: 
 
1) “who understands what about whom?”— a question that didn’t used to, but increasingly 
does matter. 
 
2) adaptability over time—we used to be able to afford early mistakes and failures, and could 
count on being able to successfully adjust.  We are losing this edge. 
 
3) restrained warfare—as a term, this should be an oxymoron, though one that made sense 
when mutual destruction was assured.  Restrained warfare is very different from restraint in 
war, yet we inadvertently conflate the two. Non-Westerners don’t. 
 
4) soldiers are victims; soldiers are heroes; we increasingly act as though soldiers are heroes 
because they are victims—while some might consider our conflicted feelings about combat a 
sign of civilizational sophistication, all such views are corrosive and endangering when war is 
underway. 
 
5) projecting menace—the extent to which American society has embraced the projection of 
menace as an acceptable means of securing social status is detrimental to soldiers, youth, and 
our stature in the world. 
 
Other shifts reflect changes in technology, a topic this paper will avoid since, as it is, our fixation on 
technological innovation biases us against the degree to which others innovate in their use of human 
beings.  This is also why, in the end, I will recommend concentrating on how to undo rather than outdo 
non-Western foes. 
 
It should be a truism by now that people who don’t fight via a professional military or abide by the 
Geneva Conventions or other laws of land warfare are much harder for us to deal with than those who 
do.  The corollary is: without becoming more ruthless ourselves, we can’t outdo adversaries who are 
willing to do things with and to other humans we can’t countenance. 
 
As for what it will take to undo (rather than outdo) others, the U.S. military does not specifically screen 
for wile.  But it could. Wile requires a different set of traits than those needed for the kinds of 
unconventional activities being pushed today (e.g. advising, and ‘shaping and influencing’).  William 
Donovan, founder of the OSS, dealt in wile.  So did Edward Lansdale.  The catch today is that non-
Asian non-Westerners are considerably more sophisticated about us than they were in the immediate 




PREMISE – THE NON-ASIAN NON-WEST4 
For all the arguments made over the past number of years on behalf of a “democratic peace,” the surer 
bet is that no major war will be fought between the U.S. and another Western power, at least not in the 
foreseeable future.5   Worst case scenario: even if the Eurozone collapses and conflict does engulf our 
Western allies, the nature of conflict there will likely differ considerably from conflict fought with or 
against non-Westerners. 
 
Clearly no such thing as “a” (singular) non-Western culture of war exists.  Nonetheless, one can discern 
a certain post-Cold War pattern.  Professional militaries don’t fight for loot and booty, don’t rape 
women, and don’t amputate limbs or otherwise maim non-combatants. Where we see such acts occur, 
we typically find undersocialized militaries, paramilitaries, local militias, and homegrown defense 
forces. Flip this around, and the presence of such actors signals non-existent, ineffective, or grossly 
under- resourced national militaries. 
 
When a government can’t fully police and/or protect large swaths of its territory that indicates it either 
controls (or is only interested in controlling) the levers of power in what amounts to a truncated 
dysfunctional state.  Bureaucracy might still function, but little else does, which is how failure and 
fragility sucker us in. One problem with Western assistance, however, is that as soon as we arrive on 
the scene, the government we are aiding no longer has as pressing a need to resolve the problems we are 
there to help it address.  We become more than a crutch; we act as a new and conveniently exploitable 
source of resources. 
 
Once violence spins out of control—which it will without an overarching authority capable of 
(re)exerting itself—we see six effects. 1) Accidental guerrillas.6   2) Males with no prior exposure to 
military doctrine will use arms in all sorts of experimental ways. 3) Innovations in violence yield 
tactics, techniques, and procedures that others copy (think: the LTTE and suicide terrorism). 4) 
Transnational ties thicken – to arms dealers, drug smugglers, slavers, sex traffickers, etc.  5) Instability 
ripples. 6) Refugees and internally displaced persons pose regional problems and become pressure 
points used by local factions, neighboring governments, the aid industry, and others to elicit assistance. 
 
Assistance brings us back to square one: a government and military that can’t or won’t take care of 
itself.  Consequently, the starting point for intervention never signals the endpoint of violence. Instead, 
whatever assistance we provide has the potential to widen, broaden, and deepen the conflict. Feedback 
loops don’t just speed up, but get more vicious over time, while those who seek to break these cycles 
end up in circular debates themselves, disagreeing over which to concentrate on first: insecurity or a 
lack of development. Tellingly, no one raises the possibility that the situation might reflect 
fundamental differences in values and priorities among combatants, or between combatants and those 
caught in their violence, or between any or all of them and us. 
 
ROADMAP: 
This paper consists of five parts.  In the remainder of this section I will sketch what I mean by each of 
my assertions, before presenting additional supporting arguments in Parts 2, 3, and 4, and then tying 
various threads together in the Conclusion. 
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 PART 1 OVERVIEW 
 
1) Who understands what about whom? We Americans (and Westerners in general) have always better 
understood others’ social structures and methods of organization than their values, while non- 
Westerners appreciated our values long before they were able to figure out the inner workings of our 
political system or social structure.7   Non-Westerners have since caught up with us; we haven’t caught 
up with them. By this I mean we still don’t sufficiently appreciate how different their values, priorities, 
and notions of status are from ours. Nor is this just a matter of solipsism or hubris.  Rather, it has 
everything to do with how the West triumphed over the non-West in the 16th-19th centuries. 
 
To be brief, back in the days when our forebears didn’t mind using might to take away others’ rights, 
we didn’t need to take into account what subordinates thought, while those we subordinated (tribal 
peoples especially) couldn’t help but recognize that we had different values and priorities than they did, 
particularly since we made this obvious as soon as we subverted their autonomy and thanks to the fact 
that it was us trammeling their land.  Over time, and as successful 20th century liberation struggles 
revealed, non-Westerners did learn what they needed to in order to rid themselves of outside rulers—
thanks to working for, around, and with Westerners, being schooled by Westerners, and serving in 
militaries with Westerners, etc. 
 
As a consequence, today countless non-Westerners aren’t just significantly more familiar with our 
modes of organization than we are with their values, but they have the ability to operate in both arenas. 
We, on the other hand, aren’t very comfortable in their world. This has profound implications for us 
(and them), but especially us whenever we conduct operations in the non-West, though in actuality we 
can’t really operate in the non-West, at least not by non-Western standards.  Yes, we Americans can 
conduct military and diplomatic business abroad—but we don’t do so according to non-Western 
practices, on a non-Western clock, or in accord with non-Western codes of conduct.  Even if we wanted 
to, we don’t sufficiently know how.8 
 
Meanwhile,  non-Westerners’ skill at operating effectively in both the non-West and the West would 
matter less if only we were willing to bypass, ignore, or get rid of those peoples we can’t work with, 
which was a 19th and early 20th century prerogative.  But today we can do no such thing – not when we 
are working in what are, legally, others’ countries, nor given current sensibilities (to include sensibilities 
here in the U.S.).  In fact, having entered the era of ‘war among the people’ we now try to work with 
anyone who wants to work with us.  As military officers home from Afghanistan or Iraq, or officers 
who have worked in embassies, acknowledge, we thereby set ourselves up to be used. We even know 
that we are being used, though we don’t always know in what ways.  Nonetheless, policy makers 
appear to think the trade-offs are worth it.9 
 
This shift represents a total (and literal) reversal of fortune(s) between the West and non-West.10 
 
2) Adaptability over time. According to accepted wisdom, the U.S. military often flails in the beginning 
but prevails in the end which, if you flip this around and reconsider it, means that the U.S. shouldn’t 
expect to do well at the outset of any fight. 
 
Contrary to popular imagination, war has never been a set-piece affair. The enemy adapts to 
your strategy and you adapt to his.  And so you keep the interplay going between policy and 
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strategy until you find the right combination at the right time. What worked well in Iraq will 
not necessarily work in Afghanistan.  What worked well today will not necessarily work 
tomorrow. The day you stop adjusting is the day you lose. To quote one of war’s greatest 
students, Winston Churchill, you can always count on Americans to do the right thing after 
they’ve tried everything else. Trying everything else is not weakness.  It means we don’t give 
up. 11 
 
The problem with acknowledging that we Americans don’t usually do the right thing at the outset is 
that while this is surely historically true, historically we also had the luxury of time.12   Given the speed 
with which today’s media deliver messages, and the greediness of the 24/7 news cycle, we have much 
less time in which to correct our errors (and maybe even no time in some cases). 
 
When the U.S. could out-produce and out-last others we could afford mistakes. We could also better 
censor them. The American people used to also afford policy makers at least some benefit of the doubt 
on foreign policy.  However, with national security an increasingly partisan issue, Americans have 
come to display ever less confidence in and patience with leaders of both political parties, which is 
further exacerbated by the punditry’s ceaseless Monday morning quarterbacking, which is another 
relatively recent development. 
 
Thanks to all of these shifts, expectations about adaptation make us impatient enough that we want to 
see progress, which then leads us to mistake churn or changes at the margin for forward momentum.13 
 
Or, to highlight what has happened from a slightly different angle, consider the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and the attacks on 9/11. Both delivered shock and awe, to us.  Few Americans objected 
(then or now) to FDR’s response to Pearl Harbor, a deliberate raid that targeted and sank vital 
instruments of war.  In contrast, growing numbers of Americans believe George Bush’s administration 
overreacted to al-Qaeda, despite AQ’s direct targeting of civilians. The contrast in reactions should 
raise serious questions about how long the U.S. might stay the course as a coherent nation after the next 
attack, particularly if the next attack is less overtly warlike than 9/11 was – a likelihood that any 
thinking adversary should already be considering. 
 
9/11 is one reason the U.S. government is now investing heavily in soft power efforts abroad, as well as 
in stability operations and others designed to ‘shape and influence.’  Unfortunately, such activities 
overlook the fact that our presence in other countries is itself an irritant that can be used to stir up anti- 
American violence.  Worse, it would appear proponents of this approach presume the relationships and 
networks we invest in won’t be turned or compromised over time.14 
 
As for who might accept our presence or ask for our assistance, willing hosts come in three types: 1) 
besieged regimes, 2) ineffective governments, and 3) underdogs.  Unfortunately, banking on any one of 
these three generates its own set of problems since as soon as we render assistance to entity X we 
automatically guarantee enmity from those who oppose X. This is the dynamic found in all situations 
of chronic insecurity and is a third rail of civil wars.15   Elsewhere I have described the nature of our 
blindspots.16   Suffice it to say here that nothing currently being done will satisfy what we most need if 
we hope to pull off strategic diplomacy. Some of the shortcuts policy makers are being asked to 
support—whether in the form of Human Terrain Teams or Special Operations Forces working out of 
embassies—are just that. These won’t yield individuals who can pay career-long attention to 
populations abroad. Worth bearing in mind is that monitoring situations is vastly different from trying 
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to shape or influence.17   At a minimum we need the former in order to even attempt the latter.  As it is, 
we have been trying to shape and influence conditions in countries like Pakistan and Iran for decades, 
to questionable effect. 
 
As for preferentially ‘empowering’ one strongman or set of actors over another in the belief we will 
then have leverage, such investments invariably boomerang.18   No matter how liberally the word 
‘empower’ gets thrown around, what ‘empower’ describes is a transfer of power.  Vault someone into 
position and you cede to him whatever leverage over him you might have had; elevate someone and you 
show that individual just how important to you he is.  That puts him in the power position and turns 
you into his exploitable resource. 
 
3) Restrained warfare. Since the advent of the Cold War, every ‘war’ the U.S. has fought has been 
limited which, by definition, means restrained; we neither go all out nor commit our entire arsenal to 
winning.  The U.S. has been able to wage limited wars thanks to our positioning and resources.  No one 
can out-produce us. Geographically, we remain impossible to overrun.  Better still, in every conflict 
since the Mexican War, we have fought ‘over there.’ This has been hugely significant.  It means that we 
actually could have fought with less restraint had we so chosen, and that we are the ones who have 
decided to limit the nature of war.19   We like to think we have done so for ideological and moral 
reasons. But, on closer examination, this might be as much an artifact of the dawning of the nuclear 
age and the Cold War, coinciding with the luxury of no near-peer adversaries apart from the USSR.  
After all, no one we have fought against has really fought back: not Panamanians, Somalis, Serbs, or 
even the Iraqi Army. 
 
World War II marks several watersheds. Among them, our rules of engagement have grown 
increasingly complicated and more discriminating, while non-Westerners increasingly target non-
combatants.  Or, as Zhivan Alach has put it, while “The West may be retreating toward restraint in 
warfare… non-Western actors may be charging headlong toward unrestrained methods.”20   Actually, 
the anthropologically correct observation would be that everyone demonstrates restraint—it is just that 
what constitutes restraint is cross-culturally contingent, and non-Westerners don’t apply the same 
brakes we do.  Not only are non-Westerners who seize power bolder in what they are willing to do, but 
they exhibit no discernible remorse. 
 
For obvious reasons, comity between a society’s conception of war and how combatants would fight if 
they were unconstrained is harder to achieve or maintain in democracies and heterogeneous states than 
in militarized (especially militarized tribally based) societies, which leads to yet another Western/non-
Western rub. Those elements in a democracy that come closest to achieving both a collectivist and a 
‘total war’ mindset are combat units. Just in terms of fortitude— never mind combat power—combat 
units should have what it takes to prevail against the most committed foes. Thus, it is interesting to 
consider what ends up restraining them. From their point of view, policy is one constraint, civilians are 
another.  But this is not exactly fair since a range of actors have helped ensure that modern militaries 
exist to shape and influence, rather than to destroy.  At least since WWII, policy makers in, and not just 
out of, the military have helped habituate the Services to regard fighting as a signaling device.21 Recall 
Vietnam—the U.S. bombed Hanoi to get the North Vietnamese to negotiate; bombing wasn’t done to 
force them to give up.  Or more recently there is the example of Kosovo and our 79-day-long air war. 
 
Bowdlerized invocations of Clausewitz—and the conceit that war is but an extension of policy by other 
means—have helped shape current views about the purposes of militaries.  Yet, treating war as a 
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messaging device overlooks two truisms about the use of force.  First, in Western/non-Western contests, 
miscommunication is all but guaranteed. We only deceive ourselves when we assume others 
understand, or will want to understand, or will not want to purposely misunderstand the intent in our 
messaging.  Second, fighting never feels semiotic to those engaged in it. 
 
4) Soldiers are victims. This brings me to a fourth shift: the extent to which the American media, 
Hollywood, and large segments of the population now treat soldiers as ‘victims.’  Never before—and 
certainly never in the midst of war—have soldiers been so lionized as victims. It seems curious but 
telling that this doesn’t provoke greater concern. Telling – because it suggests the degree to which we 
Americans have lost any ability to modulate. Beyond just treating soldiers as victims, we also call them 
heroes at every turn.  The inevitable elision is victims = heroes. 
 
This schizophrenia is decidedly unhealthy.  As liberation struggles throughout the 20th and into the 21st 
century should remind us, the side with the clearer Cause and greater commitment will eventually 
prevail.  While a modicum of ambivalence about war may be healthy for any society (after all, not even 
Sparta could maintain itself forever), too much ambivalence in the midst of war creates paralysis or 
churn, and (again) the illusion of progress. 
 
Lack of clarity is rarely good, but it is especially problematic when facing adversaries who aren’t the 
least bit conflicted and don’t share any of our same concerns.22   This inversion represents the overriding 
asymmetry that will haunt our future. The U.S. military has pushed as hard as our current culture of 
war permits it to, operationally-speaking.  Yet, what has the military gained itself (or us), apart from an 
impressive ability to perform certain kill/capture operations?  This question is bound to become even 
more unsettling should Afghanistan and Iraq come to be considered retrospective lost causes.23 
 
How societies reincorporate combat soldiers is also illuminating. 24 For instance, today U.S. combat 
veterans are being encouraged to engage in group therapy.  Venues are being provided in which they 
can talk to other veterans. Even Medal of Honor winners from previous wars have been enlisted to 
urge returnees to reach out for help.   One unintended consequence: this reinforces both veterans’ and 
society’s attitude toward soldiers-as-special.25 
 
Two dangers inhere in the soldier-as-victim/soldier-as-damaged-goods trope. The first is that the more 
this attitude suffuses society, the more likely members of the military are to internalize it.26   Second, the 
more conflicted soldiers are convinced they feel, the more this will drive the military to try to spare 
them undue anguish and PTSD. To the extent that casualty aversion helped alter the way we 
prosecuted wars in the 1990s, PTSD-aversion post-Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to prove even more 
warping in the 2010s.27 
 
5) Projecting menace. In a 2005 paper I wrote on male youth, factional politics, and religion (“The Axis 
of Trouble”), I argued that the U.S. has lost the habit of effectively socializing young men.  I made the 
point that the military is one of the few institutions that helps youth to mature. What I did not examine 
is what can happen when other societies that have a generation (or more) of under-socialized young 
males recruit their own ‘volunteer’ forces to wage war – particularly when they motivate their young 
men to significantly different ends than we do. 
 
Since I wrote “The Axis of Trouble,” much has been published about what can (or should) be done to 
deflect young Muslim males from violence and extremism. Renewed attention has been paid to gang 
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violence in the U.S.  Few authors, however, take into account Lionel Tiger’s observations about young 
males and the allure of violence and illicitness.1 Consequently, suggestions about structured ways to 
channel adolescent rebellion— e.g., via sports teams and music contests—do not go far enough.  They 
pay insufficient attention to what will always be a driver for at least some young males: the urge to 
subvert and change the rules. 
 
One under-remarked dynamic is that while engaging in illicit and violent acts may prove challenging 
for some young men, excelling at illicitness and violence motivates others, while for yet others nothing 
is better than organizing, orchestrating, and prevailing at organizing and orchestrating illicitness and 
violence.  It is no coincidence that professional militaries take advantage of these very same 
propensities. Just consider: while serving in combat units and getting to engage in combat is sufficient 
for some, excelling at combat and climbing the rungs into ever more elite units motivates others. 
Leading such organizations is better still, though best of all—for the select few—is getting to build 
them. 
 
To cut to the chase: all societies need suitable outlets in which males can compete over status. Men will 
devise substitutes whenever there are too few outlets or those that exist are too exclusionary. Those 
they come up with will, by definition, challenge the status quo.  As is true for anything that upsets the 
status quo, violence will be one potential by-product. But violence can also result when society lauds 
certain kinds of behavior. For instance, when acting menacing is treated as an acceptable source of 
status, that opens the door to being able to act on menace.  Violence is the inevitable outcome. Once 
violence ratchets up it can spiral through communities and eventually unravel states – a dynamic that 
has the potential to invite in international actors who will engage in proxy wars of their own.  In other 
words, status competitions aren’t just an issue for male youth.  Status competitions have the potential 
to embroil us all. 
 
* * * 
 
In what follows I will address menace first because it is the least obvious, but potentially most far- 
reaching of the shifts we are experiencing.  I will then tack back to who is more willing to do what to 
whom before reconsidering where this leaves our combat arms. 
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PART 2 UNDERLYING REALITIES—A STATUS-DRIVEN LIFE 
 
Humans are status-seeking social animals. Academics might argue over which came first, status-
seeking or sociality, but that only proves the broader point: we humans have long contested all sorts of 
issues related to status—who’s smarter, faster, stronger, better, right. We also tussle over who deserves 
status, for what, displayed how, for how long, and so on. 
 
Two unspoken contracts hold societies together: 1) their members agree that in any competition for 
status violence will not get out of hand, and 2) when violence does occur in competition – in sporting 
events, for instance, or when emotions get the better of individuals – any spillover effects will be 
contained. The fact that societies cohere in the face of relentless inter-personal competition is an 
indicator that everyone either plays by the same rules, to include how to change those rules, or 
understands the consequences when they don’t.28   Or, to restate the obvious and tie it back to status: 
societies remain orderly so long as status seeking is regulated and the regulations sit sufficiently lightly 
on the most ambitious and status-hungry members.29 
 
Because order is relatively easy to maintain in gerontocracies, most societies still retain some 
gerontocratic features (though these are fast eroding, for reasons to be explained).  In pure 
gerontocracies, elders ‘rule’ by controlling critical rites of passage.  If you are a male, your reputation 
depends on how well you fulfill your duties as a boy, as a youth/warrior, and as a responsible head of 
household. Roles and responsibilities (and expectations) change every time you pass through another 
gate and move up to another status.  There are benefits to be gained all along the way, though the 
ultimate reward for being a good citizen is that you get to become an elder yourself one day. 
 
Because all males see the deference elders receive, youth recognize that all they need to do is what other 
males have always done and they too will eventually earn respect.  This encourages them to want to 
preserve and not subvert the system.30   Better still, gerontocracies impel the most violent-prone 
members of society to compete against peers in other groups via raids, which serves to also limit young 
male disruptiveness within the community. 
 
Other societies curb disruptive behavior somewhat differently. For instance, where people believe in 
witchcraft and sorcery, witchcraft accusations have a leveling effect.31   Essentially, whenever someone 
is accused of being a witch (or of unconsciously harboring ‘witchcraft’ substance) s/he is put on notice: 
“others consider you guilty of anti-social behavior; behave yourself—or else.” So long as the ‘or else’ 
includes the occasional corporal punishment, witchcraft accusations do a good job of keeping rivalries 
and social tensions in check, and from tearing communities apart. 
 
A third method of social control more appropriate for larger settings involves beliefs in reincarnation 
and/or divine judgment.  Neither requires witchdoctors nor is subject to human manipulation.  Instead, 
people, of their own volition, strive to be non-disruptive in this life in order to assure themselves a 
better status in the next life or the Hereafter.32   Or, for a slightly different wrinkle, there is the Zen 
practice of making the most out of your lot in life regardless of the station to which you were born. 
 
All such methods pit individuals against an ideal and not just against one another.  Though again, 
perhaps the most striking attribute such systems share is their ability to deflect men, and young men in 
particular, from wanting to rebel.  Contrast this with our approach in the U.S., where disrupting the 
status quo isn’t just actively encouraged, but rewarded. 
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We Americans share no overriding belief in divine judgment; we don’t even all agree that heaven or hell 
exist. Instead, we (like other Westerners) employ police and all sorts of written rules and regulations to 
check our behavior. We encourage anyone and everyone to pursue success regardless of age, gender, or 
background.  By marrying free market principles to meritocratic ideals we thus make the most of 
heterogeneity.33   But this also means the sky is the limit when it comes to who is likely to try what, 
which (again) is why we need someone (police) or something (written laws and formal government) to 
regulate us. 
 
Among the many impressive things our system accomplishes is that few individuals who chafe against 
the law find any real reason to want to undermine the system that polices them.34   Thanks to our 
liberties, to include individuals’ ability to succeed and fail and then succeed again, there is little interest 
in violent revolution or insurgency.  This does not mean, however, that we can’t fall prey to entropy, or 
aren’t enamored of violence.  To illustrate, just consider where our metrics for success have led us. 
 
WHEN MONEY IS THE METRIC 
There is no hierarchy of statuses in the U.S.35   No method of attaining status is considered so much 
better than others that everyone vies to excel in ‘it.’ Whenever a career, profession, or identity becomes 
the career, profession, or identity to have, something else comes along to knock it off its perch. This is 
true for every money-making enterprise you can think of—in virtually all fields.  Consider the 
professions: medicine, law, and business.  Or science and technology. Who or what has had cachet? 
Engineers, astronauts, computer nerds…36 Instead of the socialist mantra, “from each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs,” it is as if we operate by “from each according to his abilities, 
to each according to whatever the market (read: public) decides.” Software moguls, sports figures, 
actors, politicians—all can earn untold sums of money. With money comes attention. With attention 
comes status.37 
 
One result is that we have what amounts to a free market for status whose downside is that once status 
floats, infamy can attract as much renown (and remuneration) as does genuine achievement. While 
talent has never been enough to earn someone a world class reputation— timing, access, patronage, 
sponsorship, and a talent for attracting attention have also always mattered—in previous eras there 
were clear arbiters for who and what was deemed acceptable. There were rules that royals, aristocrats, 
members of the Establishment—those with the wherewithal to grant and withhold status—applied; 
they were the talent police.38   It is only since they lost their status that status has become unmoored. 
 
The argument I am heading toward is status unmoored > menace unmoored > recovery = difficult. To 
get there requires adding one more straw to the camel’s back. 
 
Once the market becomes the arbiter of status, money no longer simply ties people together 
economically, but suddenly gives everyone the same thing to shoot for: more.39   What makes ‘more’ 
such a useful target is that individuals can stop acquiring money whenever they feel they have enough. 
Or— they can keep going. The fact that some will always keep going, and will never be able to earn, 
inherit, or otherwise acquire sufficient sums means their competitors won’t stop either. This has all 
sorts of inflationary effects, and ends up affecting us all.40 
 
One happy by-product of the never-ending desire to out-do one’s peers and predecessors is people will 
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push the edges of all sorts of envelopes.41   For instance, just compare IT today with IT 20 years ago. Or 
energy efficiency, health care, or you name it, at least some of which is now driven by competitive 
philanthropy.  Or take democratic freedoms.  Activists’ ability to raise money and awareness and break 
down or blast past barriers is exactly what liberty promises. In many regards, expanding opportunity 
represents status’s (and not just freedom’s) ultimate frontier. However, for anyone who believes that 
some kinds of limits or standards are critical to social order, money’s solvent nature cannot be 
considered wholly benign or cost-free.42 
 
Rather, money ends up blurring all sorts of distinctions, good and bad.43   For instance, we no longer 
hierarchize occupations in the ways societies – to include our own – used to, and though it may seem a 
stretch to say that “anything goes” is antithetical to maintaining social order, an “anything goes” 
attitude does impact to whom and to what we pay respect.44 
 
“ANYTHING GOES” – MENACE 
In classic gerontocracies, standards of behavior were pegged to age. Elders needed to act with gravitas; 
they earned respect by pursuing responsibility, not fun.  In contrast, consider who, or rather what, 
adults of all ages in the U.S. idolize: youth culture—which we then market en masse to the world.  Nor 
is youth all we export. Along with youth we glorify menace.  Just look at how we treat menace on the 
big screen, small screen, and computer screen, or in the music industry, and then reflect on how well we 
reward actors, producers, and directors of menace-as-entertainment. They earn so much money that 
they have turned the very projection of menace itself into a lucrative lifestyle and source of status. 
 
What do I mean by ‘menace’? Menace intimates power: defer, or else.  In vulgar terms: “look at 
me/don’t look at me, I can f--- you up.”45 
 
Without question, being able to act physically menacing on the mean streets, in the Wild West, or in 
high school cafeterias has long served useful force protection purposes.  However, societies 
traditionally used to differentiate between those who acted menacing out of self-defense and those who 
acted menacing by choice. Thugs and bullies have always been able to command respect.  But in 
civilized societies (to include all tribal societies), they never attained public adulation. Today they often 
do. 
 
Whether we trace this development back to the rise of the anti-hero post-WW II, or to music parents 
didn’t like in the 1950s, or to the large screen depiction of rebels, gangsters, and outlaws a suite of 
things in the second half of the 20th century began to encourage youth to be bad, and to keep being bad.   
Cable television, video games, social media, and marketers have further intensified and spread this 
meme.46 From John Wayne and West Side Story to Rambo and the Godfather, to the Sopranos and the 
Sons of Anarchy today, menace’s image has only grown crasser and slicker. Worse, radicalization 
hooks right into menace’s allure.  And thanks to what the U.S. exports, we are only just starting to 
experience some of menace’s unanticipated downstream effects. 
 
RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 
Among the factors said to contribute to youth radicalization are anger, frustration, hopelessness, 
inherent idealism, the quest for peer approval, the search for identity, the desire to belong, the idea of 
adventure, and the need for Cause.47   Unmoored adolescents might be motivated by any or all of these. 
In addition, they will usually need to test (as in discover) who comprises their most important audience: 
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peers, elders, members of the opposite sex, society at large, or just a small circle of intimates.48   Without 
question, some adolescents face limited choices from the outset.49   But even so, no healthy society forces 
youth to refuse to accept responsibility, defy authority, or break the rules.50 
 
In traditional societies, elders figured prominently because they held the keys to marriage and the 
future.  Young men had to prove themselves acceptable as potential sons-in-law if they hoped to head 
their own households one day; this was the societal ideal for all males. The fact that so many young 
men today do not see a future in which they will be able to make ends meet, attain a wife, or support a 
family is one important source of frustration. But that hardly explains violence among American youth 
who aren’t trying to become heads of household.51   Just the opposite describes them. 
 
It would have been unthinkable in a traditional gerontocracy for young men to father children, act 
irresponsibly, and still be able to attract additional young women. Yet, not only has this become a 
possibility in the U.S., but few male elders dare vigorously condemn it. The result is that young women 
have been left free to choose the males that most suit them, and they often choose ‘bad’ boys over good 
men, which in turn suggests that when the choice is left up to them, young women like menace and 
males who can dominate. Maybe most women do.52 
 
Biological anthropologists would likely sum this up as evolutionary evidence of male-male competition 
and female choice. But we can also explain it sociologically.  It can’t be a coincidence that all successful 
societies used to set parameters for competition(s) that enabled the strongest, smartest, fastest males to 
display their dominance over others in venues that impressed young women, but where, while women 
could observe they couldn’t compete. What better method was there for killing multiple birds with one 
stone, to include preventing young males from upsetting the local social order? 
 
Societies today offer fewer of these venues. Take ours.  Programs designed to combat gang violence 
and prevent youth from joining gangs sometimes include single sex activities like boxing or the martial 
arts.53   But more often one finds lists of best practices that extol the virtues of: 
 
• Addressing elevated risk factors for joining a gang. Strengthening families. 
• Reducing youth’s conflicts. 
• Improving community-level supervision of youth. 
• Providing training for teachers on how to manage disruptive students. Providing 
training for parents of disruptive and delinquent youth. 
• Reviewing and softening school “zero tolerance” policies to reduce suspensions and 
expulsions. 
• Ensuring that punitive sanctions target delinquent gang behaviors, not gang apparel, 
signs, and symbols. 
• Providing tutoring for students who are performing poorly in school. Increasing adult 
supervision of students after school. 
• Providing interpersonal skills training to students to help resolve conflicts. Providing a 
center for youth recreation and referrals for services. 
• Providing gang awareness training for school personnel, parents, and students. 
Teaching students that gangs can be dangerous. 
• Providing training for school resource officers in mediating conflicts.54 
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One reason I reproduce this list at such length is to draw attention both to what it doesn’t include and 
to its units of amelioration: individuals, families, schools, and gang-afflicted communities.  Yet, 
broader society is never invoked.  Nor is the need to readjust societal standards.  Instead, gangs are 
essentially treated as certain communities’ problems. The connection isn’t made back to broader 
mores, or the society-wide norms that will act as internalizable self-policing mechanisms. 
 
What is written about gangs is of a piece with what is written about groups like al-Qaeda: 
 
…al-Qaeda inspired terrorism in the West shares much in common with other counter-cultural, 
subversive groups of predominantly angry young men. Being radical and rebelling against the 
received values of the status quo is an important part of being young.  Ways must be found to 
ensure that young people can be radical, dissenting, and make a difference, without it resulting 
in serious or violent consequences.55 
 
Or, as Scott Atran has written, 
 
It is… important to provide alternate local networks and chat rooms that speak to the inherent 
idealism, sense of risk and adventure, and need for peer approval that young people everywhere 
tend toward.  It even could be a twenty-first-century version of what the Boy Scouts and high 
school football teams did for immigrants and potentially troublesome youth as America 
urbanized a century ago…56 
 
Which is all well and good but, again, Atran concentrates on local—not societal—units of 
amelioration, and he never acknowledges menace’s allure. 
 
For a slightly different variation on this theme, John Venhaus categorizes those attracted to AQ into 
four types: the revenge seeker, the status seeker, the identity seeker, and the thrill seeker. To counter-
act AQ’s appeal, Venhaus touts service projects that would “provide outlets for at-risk youths to 
connect them with their communities.” 57   He recommends music and sports for the revenge seeker; 
political discourse and call-in radio shows for the status seeker; sports leagues, model governments, 
student societies, community service programs, and adventure groups for identity seekers; and first-
person shooter games and other sources of vicarious thrills for the thrill seeker.58 
 
But laudable as these are, none again addresses the need (or desire) of some young males to prove just 
how effectively they can literally dominate others.59   Yet if, as I am arguing, literal dominance matters 
for at least some males—as well as the females they hope to attract—then much like William James’ 
moral equivalent of war, the remedies being proffered aim for an equivalence they can’t possibly match 
since none addresses the ineffable appeal of getting to be bad, an appeal hyped by Hollywood and other 
outlets across society (and increasingly the globe).60 
 
OTHER CATALYSTS 
Meanwhile, although social scientists who write about radicalization concentrate on inequality and 
grievance more than they do on the male need to posture, their attention is not wholly misplaced. Most 
youth will react to rampant injustice with righteous indignation; all youth can feel profound outrage 
over something. 
 
The grievances youth respond to can be direct—events they’ve experienced.  Or they can reflect what 
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someone has taught or is teaching them.61  Often it is said that youth (and adults) who feel they have 
nothing to lose feel that way because they have nothing to begin with and/or nothing to look forward 
to. Yet, individuals like these rarely lead violent movements. Instead, they make excellent foot 
soldiers, particularly when led by those who have been willfully, personally dispossessed and/or robbed 
of whatever may have been most important to them.62 
 
In addition to the differences white hot anger or revenge can make, consider what Sierra Leonean 
novelist Aminatta Forna has one of her characters say: 
 
Have you ever wondered what it is that makes people do terrible things? I have since that day 
[when rebels showed up in Freetown].  I have set my mind to it many times.  All of the stories 
of supernatural beings and yet those men and women out there were not so different from me, 
only that something inside them had been unleashed. So, where does it come from, the fury? A 
thousand indignities, a thousand wrongs, like tiny knife wounds, shredding a person’s 
humanity. In time only the tattered remnants are left.  And in the end they ask themselves – 
what good is this to me?  And they throw the last of it away.63 
 
Alternatively, thresholds can be buried so deeply inside people that they themselves don’t know they are 
there until they have been crossed— this is how one Sikh woman explained her middle-aged husband’s 
radicalization in the mid-1980s, at the height of Sikh separatism.64   Or here is Rhodesian-born 
journalist Peter Godwin’s description of a black colleague’s reactions to revisiting Matabeleland, where 
25 years previously his sister had watched their father being shot in the head: “Hearing all the 
recollections of the massacres seems to have triggered in him simultaneous feelings of anger and 
impotence”65 
 
Amnesia can be highly adaptive in the face of knowing there is nothing you can do to change a 
situation. Or it can mask an inability to be articulate, which itself can become a source of rage. 
 
Linguistic dispossession is a sufficient motive for violence, for it is rage that has no words – 
rage that overwhelms one with darkness.  And if one is perpetually without words, if one exists 
in the entropy of inarticulateness, that condition itself is bound to be an enraging frustration.  
In my New York apartment, I listen almost nightly to fights that erupt like brushfire on the 
street below – and in their escalating fury of repetitious phrases (“Don’t do this to me, man, 
you fucking bastard, I’ll fucking kill you”), I hear not the pleasures of macho toughness but an 
infuriated beating against wordlessness, against the incapacity to make oneself understood, 
seen.  Anger can be borne – it can even be satisfying – if it can gather into words and explode in 
a storm, or a rapier-sharp attack.  But without this means of ventilation, it only turns back 
inward, building and swirling like a head of steam – building to an impotent, murderous rage. 
If all therapy is speaking therapy – a talking cure – then perhaps all neurosis is a speech dis-
ease.66 
 
There are several threads worth pulling here. 
 
Well socialized individuals are rarely at a loss for knowing what to do, what to say, or how to act. 
When crises erupt or ruptures occur and people suddenly lose their bearings, such individuals step into 
the breach or rise to the occasion and act as though they know what is required. Not uncoincidentally 
this is how all long-lasting empires were governed: those in control remained in control, in part by 
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controlling their emotions.  And control—not lack of control—was admired.  However, where 
socialization is lacking, where no clear parameters exist, and where being ‘dangerous’ earns respect 
(especially from young women), opportunists who seek to take advantage by whatever means they can 
will prosper, and in an “anything goes” free-for-all the means that prove most effective will invariably 
involve force. Then, once some use force, those bent on overcoming them will have to apply greater 
counter-force.67 
 
This, in a nutshell, is why militaries exist— though if we look at all the purposes professional militaries 
serve, they don’t just react to and rein in violence. They also socialize young men.  Ironically, militaries 
provide youth with more varied outlets for competition and sources of status, to include allowing those 
who want to project menace to do so in controlled ways, than anything else humans have devised.  
They should be ideal for counter-alienation and counter-radicalization purposes. 
 
In fact, historically, illiterate or otherwise unskilled young men could often count on finding secure 
livelihoods (and identities) through enlisting.  But, as Karl Marlantes points out, the advent of all- 
volunteer militaries has made this much more difficult.68   So has advanced technology.  Indeed, it is 
increasingly unclear what might fill this void for males who don’t like to read, write, or compute. 
Which is not to suggest we should want our future military filled with un-educable youth.  But it does 
raise the question: if the armed forces have always served as one haven for otherwise inarticulate young 
men, what will serve that purpose in an age of diminishing opportunities for enumerate, aliterate 
youth? 
 
This hints at a very different kind of civil-military divide than the gap everyone usually worries about, 
particularly since young males are not likely to realize (or believe) that their long-term future looks as 
bleak as it does until society demands that they grow up and act like ‘men’ which, should society ever 
decide to do so, would come too late for those it has never adequately socialized. 
 
SLIPPERY SLOPES 
To restate the challenge: given the volatility of young males, societies need to have some set of 
sanctions they can and will apply, but these also need to be sanctions that mean something to youth. 
Otherwise, youth won’t see any need to act with restraint.  For instance, in the documentary “Shake 
Hands with the Devil,” former UNAMIR commander Romeo Dallaire is asked why he thinks young 
Hutus in Rwanda engaged in such gratuitous acts of violence against Tutsis? Why, for instance, did 
they escalate from chopping off people’s feet to severing their legs? Dallaire suggests they did so out of 
one-upmanship, experimentation, and a sick sense of humor: once young males had machetes in hand, 
they competed against each other to see how much a human body could (literally) withstand.69 
 
In other instances, a somewhat different dynamic can set off youth, such as has happened in Algeria, 
Palestine, or Pakistan, where older radicals inadvertently set their juniors up to outstrip them: 
 
… Rahman and JUI were no longer the toughest Islamists on the block. In 2002, they rose to 
power as the ‘bad boys’ on the political scene, with their turbans and Taliban talk.  But five 
years later, they looked old and washed up, victims of the growing divide between the pro-
Taliban leaders of yesterday and those of today.  And if the high point of Rahman’s career 
came in 2002, his low point came in 2007, during the insurrection of the Red Mosque. 
 From January through July 2007, when male and female rebels overran the children’s 
library, then kidnapped a brothel madam, some police officers, and six Chinese masseuses, and 
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finally holed up armed inside the Red Mosque, Rahman repeatedly tried to talk the Ghazi 
brothers out of their reckless adventure, but his influence inside the mosque was limited.  “They 
are simply beyond me,” he said at one point.70 
 
The U.S. and our culture of menace surely can’t be held responsible for these kinds of (d)evolution—
except that U.S. exports have alternated between entertainment and arms sales for decades. This means 
we probably have helped promote the allure of projecting violence (to include terrorism) without 
realizing all the various ways in which it would converge with, and help accelerate, political instability. 
But, even if everyone purveying violence – from Hollywood studios to videogame makers to rappers 
and advertisers – were to suddenly stop glamorizing menace that would still not have sufficient effect.  
At least not so long as leaders the world over continue to want to associate themselves with larger than 
life muscle, to include our own politicians who happily pose in tank turrets, on the decks of battleships, 
or in front of MRAPs. 
 
Bottom line: for better or worse, it is hard to find anyone immune from wanting to “feel the magic” 
menace confers.71 
 
In some ways this is hardly new.  As a threesome, ‘power, status, and the instruments of war’ comprise 
the world’s oldest iron triangle.  However, what has changed is menace’s appearance.  Just compare 
footage of combatants from WWII (or even Vietnam) to footage from Iraq and Afghanistan.  From 
tricked-out M16s to up-armored soldiers, the amount of gear, bulk, and heft one sees today is 
overwhelming. On a certain level the steroidal nature of our military makes sense: the U.S. should want 
to project an image of impervious, invulnerable, unbeatable strength.  Indeed, ask most Americans 
what they would want our military to non-verbally communicate and they would probably answer: 
“don’t even bother trying to fight us.” But then, ask non-Westerners what they see when they look at 
U.S. forces bristling with menace, and at least some might say a Goliath. 
 
One problem with Goliaths is that they attract Davids. 
 
The most long-lasting exhilaration humans can experience comes from fighting against something 
bigger and more powerful than themselves.  Outwitting, undermining, and tripping up the world’s 
greatest army, navy, or country is bound to appeal to at least some youth everywhere for two reasons.  
First, nothing represents a more worthwhile Cause.  Second, there is no faster way to prove one’s worth 
as a leader (and thereby earn status) than to try to orchestrate a successful attack against Goliath.72   We 
thus become a looming target for high risk, high gain types. 
 
Of course, in reality, no contest ever pits one side’s brains against another’s brawn; that is far too 
cartoonish.  However, Washington does end up Goliathizing America’s presentation of self whenever it 
deploys our military abroad.  No matter how much we might like to think warships delivering tsunami 
aid or doctors in camouflage conducting MEDCAPs and VETCAPs softens our image, such actions 
cross more signals than we realize.  Not only does our largesse suggest overwhelming capabilities, but 
gratitude has the in-built potential to turn into resentment over time.73   None of which is to suggest 
that we shouldn’t want our military to project menace.  Rather, my argument is that since we project 
menace, we then shouldn’t pull our punches in a fight.74 
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PART 3 NON-WESTERN ADVANTAGES 
 
We Americans are bound to misread how our power feels to others, especially when one considers we 
have been a global power since WWI.  No living native-born American knows what it is like to hail 
from a non-power.  In fact, with so much real power at our disposal, we would be hard pressed not to 
assume that if we just show up offshore (Iran), or demonstrate our ability to engage from on high 
(Kosovo), or promise shock and awe (Iraq) that should suffice to set things straight on the ground. 
 
Unfortunately, the fact that we can out-perform (out-shoot, out-fly, out-finance, and out-supply) every 
other military now leads some to assume we can similarly out-maneuver others in the info-sphere as 
well.  However, the supposition that if only we come up with the right narrative we will be able to 
control, convert, and/or coopt people elsewhere ignores a number of hard, impolitic truths. Among 
them: locals will always be able to outdo us in their language, on their turf, and when communicating 
with their relatives.75   In fact, for us to assume that locals will accept our version of events when either 
they or those they trust can claim to have experienced those events for themselves is nothing short of 
wishful thinking.  Worse, it insults others’ intelligence and leads us to further self-deceive. 
 
Consider, for instance, the following joke, which was making the rounds in Baghdad prior to 2007. In 
addition to offering a sly commentary about who is better able to take advantage of whom, it highlights 
how inadvertently useful we have made ourselves abroad: 
 
An American, a Brit and an Iraqi were in a bar one night having a beer. The Yankee gulped 
down his beer, threw the glass in the air, pulled out a gun and shot it to pieces.  He looked at 
his companions and explained: “In the US our glasses are so cheap that we don’t need to drink 
from the same one twice.” The British guy was impressed, so he swallowed his own beer, 
tossed the glass into the air and shot it to pieces.  He boasted: “In Britain we have so much sand 
to make glasses that we don’t need to drink out of the same glass twice either.” Their Iraqi 
companion paused for a moment, picked up his beer, drank it, threw the glass into the air – 
then pulled out his gun and shot the American and the Brit dead.  “In Baghdad we have so 
many Americans and Brits that we don’t need to drink with the same ones twice,” he said.76 
 
My assertion in this section is that non-Westerners don’t have to catch up with us or surpass us 
technically or logistically. They have other methods by which to bog us down, exploit, and counter us. 
Conceptually they possess four advantages:77 
 
1) their ability to code-switch 
2) they know what they can get away with given our patterns of behavior 
3) they are more sophisticated than we give them credit for – even when what they do seems 
primitive 
4) they have a different conception of power, don’t believe in fairness, and are willing to 
experiment with violence 
 
UNASSAILABLE LOGIC, IRREFUTABLE FACTS 
We Americans take an a-cultural approach to other people(s). Our modus is to work as hard as 
possible to make ourselves understood, the more insistently (and loudly) the better. This reflects our 
frontier mentality: we can make friends anywhere; we don’t put down stakes; we know we’ll move on; 
why look back?  Getting others to ‘get’ us is not only how we succeeded in absorbing immigrants 
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during the 19th century, but reflects what has been most consistent about our policies toward American 
Indians (the non-Westerners we should know best): “you become us; that precludes us from having to 
understand you.”  Additional factors that explain why we don’t code-switch very well include our 
location, size, and Anglo heritage. 
 
The non-West, on the other hand, is full of competing separable societies. Who dominates who shifts 
over time. The combination of hierarchy and foreign rule helped set the template; local elites had to 
become as skilled as possible at switching between local/non-Western and supralocal/Western codes if 
they hoped to remain elite. Given this kind of legacy – considerably different than ours – it only makes 
sense that those who rise to leadership positions would be particularly good at straddling multiple 
worlds. For example, consider Cote d’Ivoire’s first president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny.  Born in a 
village in 1905, he served as head of state from 1960-1993: 
 
…commonly assessed as a consummate opportunist and petty tyrant, [Houphouet-Boigny] was 
in fact a far more complex character. He was, until the last ten years of his life, a master 
politician who managed to combine like few others control over a relatively efficient ‘modern’ 
state and the workings of a more ‘traditional’ political economy of reciprocity. He was able to 
integrate the attributes of the wise, benevolent, ‘traditional’ chief with the qualities of the 
experienced ‘modern’ politician who had mastered the intricacies of parliamentary and 
electoral politics as an MP in the French parliament and a minister in the French government.78 
 
Like Houphouet-Boigny, today’s non-Western politicians continue to have to be able to appeal to 
villagers (a significant percentage of their electorate), and they have to be able to woo us, their Western 
donors. They also have to recognize which is more important to do, when.  For instance, on taking 
office and “to bolster his position, Joseph [Kabila, president of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC)] immediately embarked on a diplomatic offensive.  As one political analyst of the region 
remarked, ‘Devoid of any national constituency, he had decided to treat the international community as 
his powerbase.’”79   Lacking a strong ethnic constituency of her own, Ellen Sirleaf (Liberia) has similarly 
counted on international supporters to bring in foreign aid, which has helped her stay in power.80   In 
contrast, Paul Kagame (Rwanda), has managed the opposite.  By rescuing Tutsi co-ethnics (and 
Rwanda) from the 1994 genocide with no Western assistance, he now uses this fact as a moral cudgel.  
Some of Kagame’s critics have gone as far as to suggest that he purposely held back his army and didn’t 
rout Hutu extremists and genocidaires as quickly as he could have, just so that he would be able to 
make political use of genocide – a cruel allegation to be sure, but one that reflects how cunning 
Kagame’s political opponents think he is and how brutally they are willing to wield logic themselves.81 
 
We tend to forget: in much of the world argumentation remains a high art. It also offers the ultimate 
non-kinetic weapon since even when it doesn’t persuade it can disarm.  Nor is there anything today 
that prevents non-Westerners from turning all sorts of readily available facts against us. 
 
For instance, consider how adept President Joseph Kabila is at defending his record in Congo: 
 
“You criticize democracy here, but our elections turnout was over 80 percent – in the U.S., 
barely half of the voters show up,” he told an American diplomat.” When confronted with 
allegations of corruption, he countered with the Enron scandal in the United States and Silvio 
Berlusconi’s manipulation of laws to protect himself from prosecution.82 
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Or here is Dr. Abdul Razzak Sikander talking to reporter Nicholas Schmidle at Sikander’s madrassa in 
Karachi: 
 
“These boys [Sikdander’s students] come to our madrassa because they want to become experts 
in Islam,” Sikander said. “[Pakistani president Pervez] Musharraf says he wants them to 
become doctors.  But they don’t want to be doctors.  If they wanted to do that, they would have 
gone to medical school. This is no different.  So why is the government trying to tell students: 
‘If you want to specialize in medicine, that’s o.k.’ But if they want to specialize in Islamic 
studies, they are supposed to diversify?  Why are my students having their rights denied? Why 
are we the center of your attention?  Why not the Jewish institutes? Or the Christian ones? 
Basically all this talk about madrassa reform just shows that Western powers are trying to rule 
Muslims in every respect.  In the West, gays and lesbians have rights.  Why don’t my students 
have the same rights?” 
 
I asked Sikander about his madrassa’s relationship with the Taliban, but he ignored my 
question and continued. 
 
“You know, I recently had another American visitor.  She was from the institute of 
peace… or something like that,” he said, referring to the United States Institute of Peace, a 
think tank in Washington, D.C. “how can the United States have an institute of peace, and still 
be involved in so many wars?”83 
 
Or how about Abdul Rashid Ghazi, Pakistani cleric and leader of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (or Red 
Mosque): 
 
when asked by a Western reporter “if his anti-vice activities signaled the ‘Talibanization’ of 
Pakistan, he replied, “Rudy Giuliani, when he became mayor of New York, closed the brothels. 
Was that also Talibanization?  You would never say that.”84 
 
Or, finally, here is Rory Stewart’s description of an encounter he witnessed in Iraq: 
 
An American democracy expert came from Baghdad to do ‘capacity building’ with the local 
council.  On a white board he drew an oblong on its side to represent the council, and then 
beneath it four vertical oblongs, to represent its subcommittees. “He is drawing a dog,” said a 
sheikh. “Are we back in primary school?” asked another.  “We are an ancient civilization,” 
said one cleric, “and they treat us like Congo cannibals.”85 
 
As each of these quotes should make clear, non-Westerners have plenty of facts at their disposal with 
which to skewer our conceits. 
 
Numerous non-Westerners also find themselves well positioned to work other seams.  Andrew 
Alderson learned this lesson while working with the director general of South Oil, the main oil 
production company in southern Iraq. According to Alderson (a British reservist and former banker), 
Mr. Waleed, his ‘advisee,’ “knew that there were two chains of command.  One was the western one, 
under which I had to follow what my American counterparts in Baghdad were saying. The other was 
the Iraqi one… these parallel command chains didn’t always talk to each other… Mr. Waleed knew 
how to exploit this to his advantage.”86 
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Positioning always matters.   
 
More than two decades ago, Ethiopia’s President Haile Mariam Mengistu reached an unspoken 
agreement with what, at the time, was a still nascent aid industry.  He allowed non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to deliver food to the starving so 
long as they didn’t report on the ethnic culling his regime was carrying out in the feeding camps their 
aid funded.  Mengistu’s implied threat: how would NGOs and PVOs be able to fundraise and keep 
themselves in business if he kicked them out of the country? 
 
Fast forward to Darfur in summer 2003. Not only did Omar al-Bashir’s government correctly calculate 
that the U.S. and Britain would be too busy in Iraq to intervene militarily in Sudan, but it succeeded in 
getting aid workers and NGOs to agree not to give out or publish “any information about the region 
that was deemed by the Sudanese authorities to be ‘political’ rather than strictly ‘humanitarian’ – as 
defined, of course, by the government…”87   To enforce this ‘understanding’ the regime used its visa 
system: 
 
Quite simply, if an NGO worker or agency infringed the rules, then they were denied a visa to 
enter and work in the country, and all visas were short term.  So rather than people being 
‘expelled’ or ‘deported’, which would have attracted a great deal of adverse publicity, aid 




INNOVATIONS IN WAR 
Refinements have also continued on the flip side of aid: war. In a recent book about warfare in post- 
colonial Africa, William Reno divides rebels into five types (anti-colonial rebels, majority rule rebels, 
reform rebels, warlord rebels, and parochial rebels) and comments on their growing adoption of mass 
media technology, videos, mobile phones, and ‘decentralized forms of communication.’89   The Arab 
Spring likewise has defense analysts and others aflutter about the significance of social media. But, no 
matter how important these developments may be, we shouldn’t let new technology divert us from all 
the other ways non-Westerners can find to turn situations inside out and put non-technological 
asymmetries to use.90 
 
Sticking strictly to Africa for the moment, there are a number of recent innovations that have little or 
nothing to do with technology, yet everything to do with cleverly using the non-material resources at 
hand: namely, other humans. 
 
Child soldiers. John Garang first started absorbing orphans into the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army in the early 1980s. Orphans showed up at his camps; he offered them security, food, and shelter 
in exchange for their doing camp chores; and over time some graduated to becoming soldiers. Next 
door in Uganda, Yoweri Museveni also put children to use. Where we see the real twist is in West 
Africa when Charles Taylor (Liberia) and Foday Sankoh (Sierra Leone) began turning children into 
orphans in order to use them as soldiers.  There are some reports that children witnessed, if weren’t 
forced to participate in, their own parents’ murder. 
 
It is hard to be objective about child soldiers, but if one suspends moral judgment for a moment they 
represent a diabolically clever innovation. Using children to commit atrocities before they have 
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developed consciences makes it likely that they never will develop them.  Child soldiers need little sleep, 
can withstand tremendous hardship, don’t know enough to question authority, aim to please, and are 
willing to experiment with violence.  At least some of these are attributes Western researchers have 
been striving to duplicate via human performance enhancement drugs and other means for years.  Best 
(or worst) of all, child soldiers aren’t just useful in the present, but as they grow up have the potential to 
be eminently useful foot soldiers in the future. 
 
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). What started as a millenarian movement/reintegration effort has 
morphed into a self-sustaining war machine. The LRA is peerless when it comes to living off the land, 
which really means living off of other people.  It rampages through an area, replenishing its stock of 
porters, bush wives, cooks, and young combatants, before moving on. Whether the LRA represents a 
wholly new form of unconventional warfare is hard to say, since similar columns may have roved at 
will through ungoverned/unclaimed territory in the past. But no insurgent or counterinsurgent force 
since WWII has proved as proficient – no doubt because none has been willing to be so ruthless. 
 
Thanks to where it originated – northern Uganda, not far from war-torn southern Sudan and 
undergoverned areas of the DRC and Central African Republic (CAR) – the LRA has long been good at 
border hopping.  Because the areas in which it operates are marginal to the governments in all four 
countries, none has had a sufficient interest in reeling it in.  But – precisely because it preys on people 
who aren’t politically significant, its persistence has also proven politically useful.  Some contend that 
keeping the LRA as a remote security threat has been crucial to Uganda President Youweri Museveni’s 
longevity as ruler of his one party democracy, which also happens to remain a security state.91 
 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).  Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame built the RPF when both were still 
Tutsi refugees in Uganda.  They built it inside Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA).  Rwigema 
rose to became the deputy commander-in-chief of the Ugandan Army; Kagame served as Museveni’s 
head of military intelligence. Other Ugandan Tutsi refugees filled other important posts.92 
 
What is remarkable is that Rwigema and Kagame deliberately assigned their fellow Tutsis to key roles 
in the NRA so that they could learn staff skills critical to running an army. Equally impressive is how 
effectively the RPF extricated itself from the NRA without burning bridges, how stealthily it moved 
itself into position to invade Rwanda, and how quickly it regrouped after a series of early disasters (to 
include Rwigema’s death). While retired Canadian general and former UNAMIR commander Romeo 
Dallaire has referred to Kagame as one of the 20th century’s greatest maneuver strategists, Kagame’s 
even greater feat may have been putting together such a capable army so craftily years in advance of its 
first operations. 
 
“The Fear” is how Zimbabweans refer to what President Robert Mugabe has wrought since 2000.93   As 
Peter Godwin notes in his book of the same name, Mugabe is conducting “’smart genocide’…  There’s 
no need to directly kill hundreds of thousands, if you can select and kill the right few thousand.”94 
Mugabe has been waging war with such low but chronic intensity that his actions don’t just fall below 
the threshold of what the international community considers to be war, but Zimbabweans themselves 
haven’t reacted as though they are at war.95   Among Mugabe’s methods is “‘the psychology of 
deprivation: Zimbabweans have learned to be self-reliant.  There’s a deep sense of individuality – no 
collective sense. We’ve become a nation of black-marketers, crooks. Robert Mugabe has subverted the 
revolution by keeping people busy just managing, just getting by. There’s no employment but people 
are busy, busy…’”96 
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At the same time, Mugabe’s government has not prevented anyone who wants to leave Zimbabwe from 
leaving, which marks a decisive improvement over the former Soviet technique of preventing its 
dissidents and malcontents from exiting.  Even better, by draining the country of his most vigorous 
opposition, Mugabe thereby ensures a remittance diaspora which helps keep his economy afloat. 
 
Mugabe’s use of ‘war veterans’ to seize white-owned farms has been equally clever.  He has unleashed 
the war vets in such an arbitrary, piecemeal manner that their seizures generate little more than tragic 
human interest stories in the West. What makes it all the easier for the international community to feel 
bad but do nothing is the fact that whites do still own a disproportionate amount of land (or at least 
did), coupled with the lingering presumption that because whites benefited from minority rule up until 
a few short decades ago, they are now receiving their comeuppance.97 Thanks to this racial dimension, 
black suffering, which is far more widespread, goes unreported.  For their part, too, Zimbabwe’s 
southern African neighbors continue to refuse to sanction Mugabe or his ruling party, proving that he 
and his inner circle aren’t just adept at pulling the right domestic levers, but know how to work the 
right international levers, too. 
 
Child soldiers, the LRA, the RPF, and Mugabe’s Fear – all represent major new wrinkles in how, with 
whom, and with what war can be waged, and these are but four examples.  In none has technology 
been determinant.98   Helpful, yes. Yet, if we were to ask most Americans— or members of the U.S. 
military—to point to the most significant inventions or innovations of the past few decades, they would 
likely cite all the things that have gotten faster, smaller, smarter, more powerful, and more precise. 
They would not point to innovations in practices, let alone practices in sub-Saharan Africa.99 
 
Among novel developments that the U.S. military has paid attention to because they do directly impact 
it, are piracy, IEDs, suicide terrorism, and ‘green on blue’ violence. 
 
Piracy per se is not new.  However, Somalis’ involvement in it is, as are some of their methods – for 
instance, their use of motherships.100   Similarly, if one thinks of IEDs as an improvement on landmines, 
the concept isn’t particularly original, though their effects have been both costly and profound.  In 
relatively short order they turned the same army that took Baghdad by speed into a plodding, easy-to- 
target force.  Thanks to IEDs, the number of U.S. (and coalition) forces surviving Traumatic Brain 
Injuries (TBIs) is unprecedented.  So are the numbers affected by PTSD. At the same time, the devices 
responsible for wreaking this havoc range from the very sophisticated to the very crude, a range that 
signals how much more comfortable our adversaries are at switching from high tech to low tech than 
are we.  For instance: 
 
When the Pentagon responded with electronic jammers, the insurgents switched to pressure 
plates. When the Pentagon deployed metal detectors, the insurgents stopped using artillery 
shells and instead filled plastic jugs with homemade explosives, with fertilizer readily available 
at any farm.101 
 
Not only does willingness to scale up or down extend the range of what is possible, but such flexibility 
enables people to plot in plain sight.  The Taliban, for instance, are reported to have used pigeons as 




Suicide terrorism represents another low tech/high sophistication innovation. Over the past three 
decades, suicide terrorists have experimented with vehicles, vests, movie cameras, shoes, underwear, 
and turbans.  Apparently, we will see surgically implanted devices next.104   Real progress has also been 
made with suicide terrorism’s spread – out of Iraq into Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and 
beyond. This shouldn’t be surprising given its advantages: First, suicide bombers embody the deed as 
propaganda.  Second, humans are not in short supply, making suicide bombers the world’s most 
inexpensive precision-guided smart weapons.  Third, no one has yet developed an effective counter. 
Nor is anyone likely to. 
 
Not only does suicide terrorism point to non-Westerners’ willingness to use techniques and resources 
that we would never consider, but it underscores their flair for weaponizing whatever they can.105   
Along these lines, but with the potential to be even more militarily damaging is ‘green on blue’ violence 
or ‘insider attacks’ in which soldiers we are training (or have trained) turn on us. Such acts have the 
potential to undermine Americans’ desire to trust any locals, and to render plans to rely on proxy forces 
seriously flawed.106 
 
Already we set ourselves up for potential counterintelligence failures whenever we have to rely on locals 
to vet locals for us. What compounds this is that where extended families comprise the social structure, 
families will invariably hedge their bets; they diversify.  This is especially endemic in inequitable states 
where families double as social welfare nets. Sometimes heads of families consciously diversify their 
children, sending one into the military, another into government, a third into a profession.107   But 
diversification can also emerge as siblings strive to differentiate themselves from one another and/or 
wives compete through (and on behalf) of their sons. Witness the Saud royal family, comprised of pro- 
Western progressives and ultra-traditional tribalists. Or consider the Karzais. No matter how short- 
sighted Ahmed Walid Karzai’s corruption seemed to be to us, the money he siphoned off will stand the 
entire Karzai clan in good stead when his brother the president loses his office (or his life). 
 
What is true of families in the capital tends also to be true of families at the village level.108   Indeed, 
family members’ loyalty to kin helps explain why trying to root the Taliban out of Pashtun areas of 
Afghanistan is an unrealizable fantasy. It would actually be foolish for any Pashtun family to not have 
some member associated with the Taliban – and, ideally, another who is on good (or at least alright) 
terms with us.109 
 
Though to us this kind of bet hedging is cowardly, and even duplicitous, and thereby breaks the rules as 
far as we are concerned, what it should highlight is the inapplicability of our rules.  All rules are cross- 
culturally contingent. The ways in which non-Westerners make use of other humans should itself drive 
this point home.  Nor do we just differ from non-Westerners in our conceptions about rules.110   There is 
also the issue of who should rule. 
 
POWER, FAIRNESS, AND VIOLENCE 
American children grow up assuming life should be fair.  Parents often have to remind us that it isn’t, 
but that rarely stops us from trying to make it fairer anyway. In contrast, people’s starting assumption 
throughout much of the non-West is the opposite: nothing suggests to them that life can, will, or even 
ought to be fair.111   And those in positions of authority use this acceptance of inequality and unfairness 
to advantage all the time. 
 
Richard Dowden, former Economist correspondent, makes two telling observations.  The first stems 
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from his experiences living in Uganda as a young man: 
 
Gradually I was acclimatized to Ugandan culture and ways of thinking.  It was a painful 
process. My youthful arrogance lay not in thinking I knew better, but believing that principles 
such as equality were universal and self-evident.  I had believed that truth was more important 
than politeness, but now I began to learn how to live in a deeply unequal society where 
politeness ranked far higher than truth.112 
 
The second insight comes from his work as a reporter: 
 
Power [in Africa] is not just about physical strength or wealth or status.  It has a spiritual 
dimension. .. A President’s secret opponents will often admit that, despite the evil that he has 
done, they admire as well as fear him.  I have often waited for an African President, chatting to 
African colleagues who openly expressed their disgust and hatred for him. Yet when the Big 
Man emerged, the same journalists ran forward, grasping his hand, fawning on him and 
throwing back their heads to howl with laughter at his jokes.  Hypocrisy? To Western eyes, 
yes, but they were simply showing due diligence by respecting power.113 
 
A typical dynamic associated with power is that people defer to X’s authority because they see others 
deferring, while if others defer that proves X must be deserving. What helps turbocharge this logic in 
places where people believe in witchcraft and sorcery is the conviction that Big Man So-and-so must be 
tapping into some alternative and suprahuman source of power; how else explain his ability to amass 
more of what everyone else wants? He clearly either employs witch doctors and/or knows how to 
practice juju himself. 
 
Just the intimation of practicing witchcraft serves as an invaluable pysop, especially since it can grant 
leaders the aura of not being able to be removed, while the longer an individual stays in office, the more 
his longevity convinces everyone he must have special powers.114    We tend to scoff at such notions. 
Because Western publics no longer give credence to witchcraft, sorcery, or the Evil Eye, we judge those 
who do so as primitive and unsophisticated.115   But this is a mistake.  In many regards, this makes them 
vastly better at playing on others' emotions than we are. 
 
Also, although we purposely distinguish among spiritual, healing, secular, or political and economic 
power, and likewise decouple justice from power, others don’t see the same merit we do in these 
separations. Take astute autocrats.  They typically engage in unjust rule, and often do so in the wake 
of bitter conflict. This makes little sense to us since the idea that “to the victor go all the spoils” would 
seem to guarantee nothing but worse trouble (and uglier payback) in the future. Our only reasonable 
conclusion: leaders like Robert Mugabe resist giving up power out of greed.  But, according to at least 
one observer, Mugabe and other ZANU-PF stalwarts don’t regard those they’d have to share power 
with as their equals. “To them, having fought in the [liberation] war gave them rights… in winning the 
war and ending white rule, they had earned a privilege that those who never fought – Morgan 
Tsvangirai, for example – could never have: the right to rule.116 
 
Three points are worth drawing out here. First, in systems where people don’t view life as having to be 
fair, those who can make it unfair in their favor will have no qualms about using all means possible to 
ensure it never becomes fair for others.117   Second, because people with collectivist loyalties operate 
according to different us/them sensibilities than do we, then when others don’t morally matter, what is 
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done to them can’t matter either. Third, when violence is added into the mix, perpetrators won’t feel 
remorse. 
 
The flip side of remorselessness is ruthlessness, though probably a more accurate way to put this is that 
remorselessness and ruthlessness are co-dependent. When a society doesn’t care what happens to 
members of a rival society (or to lessers), combatants will feel little to no compunction about indulging 
in acts we would never countenance.  But neither will combatants feel particularly guilty after the fact. 
This may be hard for us to appreciate, but if this were not the case, most societies (to include our own) 
would have had a hard time persisting and/or warfare would have grown much gentler over time.118 
 
Scan history and it quickly becomes apparent that conflict has long generated arms races (who can out- 
invent whom), organizational races (who is better at recruiting, training, planning, logistics, etc.), and 
atrocities races in which the competition is over who can better demonstrate disdain for whom.  
Thanks to our 20th and 21st century prowess at the first two— arms and organization—we assiduously 
manage to avoid the third. But again, others don’t.119   Consequently, people who regard themselves as 
morally superior, and/or look at us and see Goliath, will not feel the least bit pressured to fight us by 
any rules we recognize. 
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PART 4 OUR PROBLEMATIC SENSIBILITIES 
 
There is how we Americans prefer to fight, and then there is the way others refuse to fight us. We 
continue to turn ourselves inside out in an effort to be as precise and discriminating as possible, which 
is an admirable goal, but one that cannot possibly produce definitive wins.  As this section of the paper 
will argue, our ambivalence—about going to war but not being able to win—does not appear to be 
good for soldiers’ mental health, and therefore can’t be good for our military over the long-term. 
 
To illustrate what I mean, let me make two sets of comparisons. First, drones and IEDs.  Both have 
come into their own since 9/11. Use of drones appears to have solved a number of domestic political 
problems, since they are unmanned, can be flown into hostile territory without risking U.S. casualties, 
and lead to a much smaller U.S. presence in semi-permissive environments. But, worth remembering is 
that for all their seeming virtues, we are only in the preliminary stages of drone-based warfare. Drones 
could prove to be a game changer in our favor.  Or, we could be in what is only the first blush of a 
classic ‘first contact’ problem: initially, the ‘natives’ are intimidated, but once they get used to drones 
their awe and fear quickly dissipate.120 
 
Intimidation has to be sustained to work. Yes, drones hover and then assassinate.  But – because they 
go after individuals they don’t sow generic fear.  They don’t make populations alter their behavior or 
shift their support from bad guys to good guys.  In this sense, despite their technical wizardry, drones 
are actually less effective than IEDs when it comes to a population-centric impact.  This is because 
drones, unlike IEDs, are supposed to be discriminate, and so they should cause no collateral damage. 
When they do, or when they kill the wrong (meaning innocent) people, our mistakes are immediately 
turned against us. Those whom we are targeting whip up public wrath.  All sorts of other people try to 
take advantage, to include foreign governments which demand concessions.  At the very least we end 
up hoisted on a variety of our own petards— since violating other countries’ sovereignty in order to kill 
people against whom we have not declared war defies the essence of how we say ‘war among the 
people’ should be fought: transparently, by earning trust, building relations, respecting our partners, 
etc. 
 
In contrast to the high regard in which we hold drones, we treat IEDs as weapons of the weak. We cite 
our adversaries’ willingness to use them (and other forms of dirty war) as proof that they don’t dare 
fight us directly; we are too strong. And, to be sure, it would be foolish for anyone to try to combat us 
conventionally.  However, when we describe our adversaries as though they have no choice but to fight 
us underhandedly, we inadvertently grant them the status of being Davids to our Goliath.  In doing so, 
we also help legitimize their use of IEDs, or any other weapon they turn to—since, as we ourselves say, 
what choice do they have? 
 
In other words, for people who think we can control a narrative, we provide opponents with plenty of 
ammunition—which is not to suggest that we abandon drones or make war a fair contest. Rather, it is 
to highlight how riddled with contradictions our approach is, and how eagerly our adversaries seize on 
this. 
 
Our current reliance on drones is problematic for one more reason. Their use reveals the extent to 
which we are hedging our bets: we won’t fully commit to removing governments that can’t police their 
own populations, yet we certainly don't want to rule those populations ourselves.  Instead, we act as 
though we believe that with the right application of blandishments and threats we can successfully 
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‘shape and influence’ offending (and offensive) regimes, although a cynic might contend that the efforts 
we expend to try to get regimes to become less corrupt and more legitimate are really only for show: 
we’ll continue to do what we need to do (targeted killings), they will continue to do what they need to 
do, and occasionally our interests might align.  This describes the state of relations with numerous 
‘partners’ or ‘allies’ in the non-Asian non-West, from Pakistan to (now) Mali. 
 
FEATS, YES—DEFEAT THE ENEMY, NO 
Or, consider Iraq and Afghanistan, where the U.S. (and Coalition forces) set up air, information, and 
logistics systems half a world away that far surpassed anything that previously existed in either 
country—a true feat.  For all intents and purposes, the U.S. essentially operated highly efficient 
countries within other countries.  Beyond just being able to deliver different flavors of ice cream and 
fresh iceberg lettuce to multiple giant eating facilities at different ends of two broken countries, the 
systems we set up made it possible to carry out complex kinetic operations from behind computer 
screens, at night, every night—a total inversion of the Vietnam experience.  In Vietnam, we couldn’t 
prevent the Viet Cong from ‘owning’ the night.  Today, night vision (and other) technologies have 
reversed this cycle.2 However, just because we have inverted when we wage war does not mean we have 
yet figured out how to effectively counter an insurgency. 
 
Arguably, no one has waged successful counterinsurgency in someone else’s country without pro-active 
local participation.121 This brings me to the second comparison I want to make – back to warfare in the 
pre-Cold War era. 
 
When wars were fought between two clearly delineated sides, every combatant knew what was 
required: your side had to get through (to) the objective to win.122   It is only since the advent of people’s 
wars, or wars among the people, that both ‘getting through’ and the ‘objective’ have become inchoate. 
In a certain sense, ‘getting through’—as in ‘getting through to the locals’ and making yourself 
understood—have become the objectives.  Yet, when locals are resistant this can’t work. Worse, 
‘getting through’—as in finishing and moving beyond the war—becomes extremely difficult.123   
Vietnam may be the touchstone for a messy non-win, but it is emblematic of post-WWII warfare in 
general, beginning with Korea.124 
 
While we can’t yet know whether the era of so-called conventional war (in which uniformed forces 
fight uniformed forces) is well and truly behind us, what we do know is that through WWII Americans 
could openly hate and dehumanize the enemy; soldiers and Marines saw a lot of death and destruction; 
there were clear physical objectives—not just in terms of ‘take that hill,’ but ‘take that whole country’; 
and deployments were not determined by a rotational calendar.125   In marked contrast, exponentially 
fewer casualties today makes each one extraordinarily painful; soldiers are expected to treat foes with 
humanity even if they display none themselves; ‘a’ tour or deployment is just that – a discrete trip; and 
strategy is opaque. 
 
If it sounds like I am about to suggest that soldiers should be allowed to brutalize the adversary, use 
whatever weapons are available, and rack up casualties till the enemy submits, that wasn’t politically 
palatable even when President Eisenhower, Curtis LeMay, and others contended that devastation 
needed to be so unsparing no one should want to engage in war at all.126   However, Eisenhower and his 






1) if you are not prepared to wipe out the enemy, why fight? 
2) if you won’t or can’t wipe out the enemy, death and destruction are the wrong foreign policy 
tools to use.127 
3) and if you aren’t willing to either inflict or take large numbers of casualties, the cause must 
not be sufficiently existential.  So again, why fight? 
 
Confusion about the nature of 21st century warfare is rampant.  For instance, in The Untold War, 
Nancy Sherman criticizes Lt. Gen. James Mattis for remarks he made (after Haditha) that reveal, in her 
words, “a familiar pattern of machismo… His remarks are patently offensive, all the more so because 
they are made from a person in a highly prominent and visible leadership role, the kind of person we 
expect and entrust to prosecute war using his better humanity.”128   Prosecuting war using one’s better 
humanity is a bizarre idea, although the fact that an academic teaching at a military school might think 
it possible to defeat a ruthless foe by being humane simply underscores the point that, as a nation, we 
haven’t considered any of our recent wars to be existential.129   We have treated all of them instead as so 
limited that they haven’t had to be won. 
 
To be fair, Sherman’s concern isn’t with winning or losing, but with combatants’ mental well-being—a 
bailiwick that usually belongs to psychologists and psychiatrists.  However, as the rising number of 
military suicides and PTSD diagnoses suggest, perhaps the problem is less that we have too few or the 
wrong kind of mental health professionals, or that the military has taken too long to respond than that 
its units of amelioration are wrong.130 
 
Undoubtedly the most haunting question anyone can ask after a war is what was it all for, a question 
that suggests the outcome was less than satisfactory and/or not worth the losses incurred.  Some 
participants are likely to ask this after every war, even outright victories.  But—when such questions 
are posed in the midst of war, in a democracy, in the information-saturated 21st century, that cannot be 
good.  If today’s soldiers don’t feel, don’t want to feel, or can’t feel connected to the locals, yet 
connecting locals to their government (and destroying their connections to the insurgents) is the “war” 
aim, it is hard to see how combatants can find any larger meaning in what they do. Smaller, self-
involved meaning is surely available. It always is. The problem comes when smaller meaning takes on 
too much import. 
 
Significantly, we’ve seen no new style of war memoir emerge since Vietnam.131   Most of today’s war 
literature is still all too reminiscent of Michael Herr’s Dispatches.132   With so many similar first person 
accounts having been produced by veterans and journalists, it thus becomes hard (maybe impossible) to 
escape their echo chamber effect, making it very difficult to get a bead on what veterans feel vs. what 
they think they should feel vs. what they have been socialized to think they should articulate.133   
Nevertheless, one detects very little nationalist fervor. Patriotism, yes. But not any sense of “there but 
for the grace of God goes the U.S. – if we don’t win this war we’re lost.”  Individuals instead are said to 
(and themselves say they) perform on behalf of their unit.134   Their motivation is said to be to not lose 
face among their peers; very few believe they are fighting to save the nation from impending doom.135 
 
Contemporary accounts don’t just reflect but reinforce these unit-centric attitudes.  Journalists, 
politicians, presidential candidates, and even general officers who visit soldiers and Marines in combat 
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zones invariably return impressed and full of praise for our young men and women in uniform. It has 
become standard for them to tell audiences that this is the finest military the U.S. has ever fielded, and 
to point to just how well units have adapted to difficult circumstances.  Yet, what no one prods them to 
have to address is why, if military personnel are so good at adapting, are they not coping better when 
they get home?136   Could it be as simple as that family is no substitute for unit?  Or, is there a deeper 
issue everyone glosses over? 
 
COMBAT 
While academics debate whether the character of warfare is changing, certain features of combat 
clearly aren’t. For instance, try dating this description of combat: “It’s such a pure, clean standard that 
men can completely remake themselves in war.  You could be anything back home – shy, ugly, rich, 
poor, unpopular – and it won’t matter because it’s of no consequence in a firefight, and therefore of no 
consequence, period.”137 
 
In describing life at Restrepo and other isolated outposts in Afghanistan, Sebastian Junger goes on to 
note: 
 
These hillsides of loose shale and holly trees are where the men feel not most alive – that you 
can get skydiving – but the most utilized.  The most necessary. The most clear and certain and 
purposeful.  If young men could get that feeling at home, no one would ever want to go to war 
again, but they can’t.138 
 
Of course, when the conflict drags on too long with too few obvious gains, the goal of getting to fight 
another day begins to wear thin.  Nonetheless, as Major Rusty Bradley describes his experience in 
combat: 
 
… a primal rage consumed me. The feeling is indescribable.  There are very few in our society, 
other than soldiers, who understand it.  It is the physical combination of adrenaline, 
testosterone, exhaustion, and emotion. My rage surfaced, and it unleashed a previously 
harnessed power. Whatever it is that the brain produces during those moments, I liked it – no, I 
loved it.139 
 
Karl Marlantes remembers much the same from Vietnam.  He describes achieving feelings of “godlike 
transcendence.”140   “Combat is the crack cocaine of all excitement highs – with crack cocaine costs.”141 
 
Two additional themes recur in first person accounts about combat regardless of the era or war: the 
way the world shrinks to the immediate and the quotidian, and one’s detachment from almost 
everything else. Writing on the heels of the First Gulf War, British veteran George MacDonald Fraser 
describes his WWII experiences in much the same vein as Vietnam-era veterans or captains and majors 
today – with one major exception.  According to Fraser, no one in his generation was encouraged to 
talk about emotions.  He blames the media for this unhealthy preoccupation with feelings: 
 
… the media seem to feel they have a duty to dwell on emotion, the more harrowing the better, 
and to encourage its indulgence… The pity is that the public shapes its behavior to the media’s 
demands… no interviewer in our time was so shameless, cruel, or unpatriotic as to badger us 
into admitting our human weakness for public consumption, and thereby undermining public 
morale, and our own… 
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 Tell people they should feel something, and they’ll not only feel it, they’ll regard 
themselves as entitled and obliged to feel it.142 
 
But, Fraser may err in pointing his finger only at the media, since, as we saw with menace, plenty of 
other factors shape what people accept and expect. In the case of combat, there are multiple influences. 
Professional military education (quasi-official learning) along with popular culture—from movies 
through memoirs—play especially important roles when it comes to instilling the feelings one is 
supposed to have.  First person accounts play a particularly interesting role since, like mirrors, they can 
also reveal more than the author intends.143 
 
Take Patrick Hennessy’s The Junior Officers’ Reading Club.  After six-plus years in the British 
Grenadier Guards, Hennessy’s single deployment to Afghanistan provided him with everything he 
sought. Over the course of six intense months, he proved to himself he had what it took in combat; 
mentally recorded a lifetime’s worth of battlefield images; learned how addicting fighting can be; and 
realized that if he stayed he’d only keep chasing the dragon, seeking ever more elusive highs.  In other 
words, he checked all his personal blocks. 
 
If only Hennesy’s compatriot, George MacDonald Fraser, were still alive he would doubtless find such 
an account extremely illuminating, in large part because it is so self-absorbed.  Here we have a bright, 
capable officer who did one combat tour, then separated from the military. He never felt plugged into 
anything beyond his unit, and clearly felt no need to stay the course.144   His tenure epitomizes Problem 
#1— no existential need for combat service. 
 
Problem #2 comes from the fact that Hennessy’s Afghanistan tour was just long enough to change him 
forever in his own mind, but not so long that the experience came to feel ordinary.  In other words, his 
time in a combat zone set him apart. This feeds a somewhat different civil-military dynamic than the 
usual one that separates those who serve from those who don’t, since Hennessy now has combat 
bragging rights whose true weight others have no way to either gauge or vet, but to which they will 
defer.145 
 
Problem #3 is how few Afghans figure as individuals, let alone as a people, a Cause, or a purpose in 
Hennessy’s or most other contemporary accounts.146   For instance, Afghans make virtually no 
appearance as sympathetic figures in Sebastian Junger’s record of outpost warfare in the Korengal 
Valley. This is significant because outposts were the vanguard of the Coalition’s counterinsurgency 
efforts at the time.  Small groups of Americans (or other forces) were inserted into the heart of bad 
neighborhoods, along traditional smuggling routes, wherever their presence might thwart or disrupt 
Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. 
 
A cynic might point out that what was done in places like the Korengal is eerily similar to what didn’t 
work in Vietnam, where small teams of very young men were likewise sent to occupy select terrain, and 
ended up disconnected across space as well as through time thanks to year- (or six-month-) long tours 
of duty and changeovers in personnel. Equally demoralizing is that Americans have no more managed 
to hook Afghans to the central government in insurgent-affected areas in Afghanistan than Americans 
in Vietnam managed to successfully connect South Vietnamese villagers to the national government in 
Saigon. 
 
However, unlike the domestic animosity that the Vietnam War generated, which made it hard for 
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veterans to easily reintegrate when they returned home, the post-9/11 public has gone out of its way to 
welcome back today’s veterans.  Thus, it is somewhat puzzling that so many are having such a hard 
time readjusting.  This suggests that something else must be out of kilter.  And again, the military’s 
response to elevated rates of alcohol abuse, domestic violence, murder, and suicide while, initially 
desultory, has grown more robust over time – to include efforts to de-stigmatize mental health help.147   
So the fact that this is not proving sufficient suggests something else amiss: namely, the possibility that 
veterans’ problems don’t lie with(in) themselves alone.148 
 
SOCIETY’S RESPONSIBILITY 
It is clear that, as with menace, society transmits mixed messages. On the one hand, the public wants 
members of the military to fight the nation’s wars and win— and expresses gratitude to them for doing 
so.  But it also wants them to feel conflicted, and likes to see them express at least some angst over what 
they have done, seen, and contributed to.149    The public’s interest in, and yearning for, wounded souls 
lurks in almost every movie featuring soldiers or Marines aired since 9/11, as well as in most journalists’ 
accounts.150 
 
There are several reasons why I raise the possibility that society’s ambivalence may be a root cause of 
veterans’ readjustment problems. First, as I suggested in Part 2, at least some young men are drawn to 
violence. They want to be able to break things and kill people—or, at least test themselves against 
others who are trying to do that to us. Combat usually loses its allure once casualties mount.151   Once 
combatants see enough, see too much, and/or mature, they lose the need to see more death and 
destruction.  Clearly, individual thresholds vary and, historically, societies’ thresholds have varied, too, 
for what constitutes ‘enough.’  However, thanks to the lopsidedness of most firefights and the 
proficiency with which air assets respond to ‘troops in contact’ today, many young Americans never get 
a chance to move beyond their unit’s first casualties.152   Instead, every casualty becomes a searing loss. 
 
Contributing to this dynamic is that the fewer our overall casualties, the less inured everyone becomes 
to loss.153   At the same time, fighting is done in fairly short spurts.154   Combat is less an ongoing 
exchange than a series of disconnected ambushes. And, since keeping and holding ground is rarely the 
objective, and the enemy is ‘of’ the people—and thus, by definition, may be impossible to permanently 
rout—nothing, really, can lead to satisfaction, as in a job well done, so nothing really can compensate 
for the unit’s loss(es), which is exacerbated by every member’s unit-centric conviction that he is who 
each other is fighting for. 
 
Clearly, it would be impolitic of me to suggest that wars should produce more casualties in order to 
make getting through war easier. But, the evidence does suggest a strong correlation between having a 
large and obvious national purpose and being able to respond with ruthlessness and remorselessness. 
No society has asked combatants to be as careful or as self-reflective as ours has.155   Again, by way of 
comparison, consider Fraser’s reflections on his WWII experiences with 50 years’ worth of hindsight: 
 
Glad I was there; I wouldn’t have missed it for anything… No regrets about it, and much 
gratitude.  I can almost hear an interviewer saying: “What about guilt?”, to which I could only 
reply: “What’s to be guilty about? I didn’t ask for the bloody war.”  He might speculate, 
because it seems to be the fashion nowadays, on guilt for having survived where others did not 
– which is one of the silliest notions I have ever heard.  If you feel someone got killed because 
you let them down, that’s a reason for guilt, no question – but to feel guilty because the man 




What seems to especially complicate the situation today is the extent to which attention paid to feelings 
confuses individuals about whether they are feeling what they are supposed to feel:157 
 
“Killing people isn’t like what you think. Even the first guy I killed in Iraq, it just didn’t affect 
me that much,” Eastridge said later.  He assumed killing would somehow change him, but it 
didn’t. he expected it to be a monumental event, but Groundhog Day just kept repeating.  The 
most striking thing about it was how easy and inconsequential it was. “It doesn’t bother you.  
And then it starts to bother you that it doesn’t bother you. But you get over it. It just isn’t that 
big a deal,” he said. “Even after some of our biggest firefights I would just get in the truck and 
fall asleep, or go back and play video games.”158 
 
Eastridge eventually did break. The verdict: PTSD. 
 
Alternatively, Patrick Hennessy writes as though, with the right external validation, all can be made 
well: “… we wanted documents signed in black and white and glinting metal forged with our names to 
shout to the rafters that what we had done was not wrong, not bad, but glorious and heroic, and we 
weren’t sick to feel that it had all been such fucking good fun.”159 
 
But is this truth or trope?160 
 
The same could be asked of the 2-16 Battalion David Finkel shadows in Iraq. One sergeant whom 
Finkel respects assesses his unit this way: “’They’re angry.  Very angry’ he said of the platoon, which of 
course included himself. ‘How can anybody kill and function normally afterward? Or see someone get 
killed and function normally afterward? It’s not the human response.’”161 
 
Except – for most of human history, and for plenty of combatants even today, being able to function 
normally is the human response. Yet, as sentiments like “maybe the ultimate wound is the one that 
makes you miss the war you got it in” become the accepted norm, there is the danger that veterans’ 
inability to cope will not only be de-stigmatized, but will actually become romanticized.162   That surely 
won’t be healthy.163 
 
Already, Vietnam (or the un-winnability of war post-WWII) casts a long shadow. When Karl 
Marlantes writes the following he isn’t just relaying to the current generation how resentful members of 
his generation still feel for having had to try to heal themselves.  He is also projecting:164 
 
So ask the now twenty-year-old combat veteran at the gas station how he felt about killing 
someone.  His probably angry answer, if he’s honest: “Not a fucking thing.”  Ask him when 
he’s sixty, and if he’s not too drunk to answer, it might come out very differently, but only by 
luck of circumstance – who was there to help him with the feelings during those four long 
decades after he came home from war.  It is critical for young people who return from combat 
that someone is there to help them, before they turn to drugs, alcohol, and suicide.165 
 
Marlantes wants current veterans to benefit from his generation’s experience.  This includes learning to 
be more resilient in advance.   
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The military, to its credit, is now trying to instill resilience.166   The aim is to fortify soldiers and 
Marines before they deploy, which is surely prudent.  But, resilience still won’t redress reintegration 
issues.  It can’t – not until society is re-normed, since society is a key part of the equation. 
 
RETHINKING REMEDIES 
Psychologists and psychiatrists aren’t known to view individuals holistically; they don’t examine 
context from multiple perspectives.  In contrast, anthropologists do. So, from an anthropological 
perspective, it only seems natural to conclude that until we Americans are made to reexamine our 
attitudes toward war, our default treatment of soldiers as either clichés or caricatures will continue to 
undermine whatever progress the military might make at steeling warfighters for future wars.167   
Actually, resilience will fall short on two grounds.  First, it is reactive.  Resilience may help individuals 
deal with the aftereffects of certain experiences.  But it won’t help them (or us) defeat ruthless foes. 
(Nor will it help with TBIs, which are a by-product of ruthlessness.) 
 
Compare Americans’ attitudes today to American attitudes during World War II, when the more 
atrocities the Japanese committed, or the more aware GIs became of the horrific things the Japanese 
and the Germans were doing, the more resolute this made the U.S. Resolution doesn’t just subsume 
resilience, but absolves combatants from having to feel (or having to think they should feel) conflicted 
over what war entails. 
 
Today, resolve is left up to individuals to muster, perhaps because we have an All-Volunteer Force. 
Further complicating matters is the tortured position adopted by many members of the public over the 
past decade—“love the troops, hate the wars”—which splits impossible hairs, particularly since anyone 
who enters and then stays in the combat arms does so because he (or she) doesn’t object to being sent 
abroad to fight.168   Not only do civilians do a disservice to those in uniform when they regard anyone in 
the military as a hero—thereby shortchanging soldiers and Marines the exemplars they really do 
need—but they add insult to injury by regarding Service members as victims since this implies they are 
all dupes.169 
 
Yet, it is not just the public that views the military unrealistically.  Civilian and military leaders in the 
Pentagon and the Services are also at fault.  How often within recent memory has any senior military 
leader publicly responded “no, we can’t” in a House or Senate committee hearing? Yet, according to 
Richard Rumelt, “Good strategy requires leaders who are willing and able to say no to a wide variety 
of actions and interests.”170 
 
There are many reasons why military leaders don’t like to sound negative—at least not out loud or with 
taxpayers listening.  And, at the same time, all of us (citizens) who depend on those in uniform for our 
security do need our protectors to be unwaveringly positive and to possess a “yes we can” attitude and a 
problem-solving mindset. Yet—we and they also need someone to serve as a reality check. 
 
Under the current dispensation, civilians are responsible for making policy that the military then 
executes.  Senior military leaders expect to be asked to advise policy makers.  But, at the end of the day, 
their attitude is that they can only do the best they can with the policy they receive.  What this in turn 
enables, unfortunately, is senior leaders' ability to point to flawed civilian decision-making after the 
fact and claim to not be at fault.171   Worse, such an arrangement facilitates a situation whereby senior 
military leaders don’t have to say ‘no’ and don't have to achieve a “win” since, by deferring to policy 
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makers, they can maintain a modicum of morale within the ranks ("it's not our fault") and retain high 
public approval.  While some of this surely represents an improvement over what transpired during the 
Vietnam era, and is proof of the military's ability to learn and adapt, it does raise the question: what 
then is the point? 
 
I do not mean to suggest that military leaders should (or do) want policy to be opaque or confused. 
But, over time, those who have risen to the top have clearly learned to accommodate themselves to this 
likelihood, and have learned to try to make the best of incomplete, non-existent, or bad policy. As it is, 
when no one can offer a compelling overarching plan, officers at all levels will default to what they do 
know how to do, which is to perfect processes.172 
 
At every level, leaders know they can ask their subordinates to conduct operations, and that every 
operation will yield something—whether contact with the enemy, intelligence, training, or ‘just’ 
practice.  Ideally, over time, discrete or semi-coordinated operations may even add up to overall 
success.173 As it happens, the military has also developed myriad techniques for making success look 
likely. For instance, take 21st century operations centers. They pull in endless streams of information 
which staffs thin slice and reassemble in an effort to spot patterns and trends.  Countless hours are then 
devoted to putting together color-coded maps and charts and boiling down storyboards and sitreps for 
higher-ups’ consumption. The aim: ideally someone with sufficient rank will be able to see the forest in 
addition to the trees. 
 
Unfortunately, one problem that occurs when reports from outposts X, Y, and Z, and forward 
operating bases A, B, and C are blended together is that they automatically create a narrative.  
Narratives convey momentum, and since momentum is what everyone needs to see, events in the field 
begin to be treated as ‘effects.’ Operations can then all too easily start to look as though they have been 
executed more (or less) according to plan, regardless of whether anything is actually gelling on the 
ground.  And, since the military runs on reporting: the more operations, the more reports, the more 
progress. 174 
 
Being able to accurately read and assess trends has always posed a military challenge, and explains why 
armies have historically concentrated on casualty figures (or body counts and kill ratios) as well as 
ground gained.  It seems telling that, to this day, no one yet has come up with better metrics with. As 
Brent Clemmer points out, more honors continue to go to those who demonstrate valor in combat than 
to those who excel at advisory or non-kinetic counter-insurgency activities, which means that despite 
what general officers have said population-centric effects require, their actions—in terms of what and 
who they reward and promote—belie their words.175   It is not just society, then, sending mixed 
messages. Crossed signals are equally endemic within the military.   
 
As for who bears the greater responsibility for un-crossing signals, policymakers or general officers, the 
answer should be obvious: general officers.  They are the individuals their subordinates obey.  General 
officers are supposed to be the repository of military wisdom.  They represent the only reality check 
short of reality. Only general officers can prevent the public and policy makers from falling prey to a 
variant of the CSI effect, and the idea that the military—and classified Special Operations units in 
particular—are capable of winning under any circumstances. Operationally-speaking, SOF and other 
units can do a lot. But as the last decade should make clear, that doesn’t mean that they (or anyone) 
can wage clean, soft, zero- defect warfare the way the public and policy makers expect war to be 




At the same time, in the division of labor between who bears the responsibility for being realistic about 
what is possible, and who needs to still be able to believe anything is doable, operators (soldiers and 
Marines in the field) do need to believe they can do anything asked. In this paper’s view, the way to 
square the circle between optimism and realism is to put the onus squarely where it belongs.  General 
officers need to own the war they plan and need to commit to seeing it all the way through to its 
conclusion—which must entail either our adversaries’ defeat or ours.176   Anything less attenuates 
everything, to include combatants’ mental health. 
 
* * * 
 
As previously mentioned, Afghanistan’s and Iraq’s longer-term costs will partially depend on how and 
when both these incursions ‘end,’ though without declarations of war and without anyone having 
defined what winning means it is not clear either can end. We have consequently laid plenty of mine 
fields for ourselves—in individuals, in the body politic, and in Central and Southwest Asia. 
 
To cite just one example: much has been written over the past several years about tribal codes, and 
Afghan and Iraqi attitudes toward us. Yet, none of the experts who have advised general officers about 
how to wage counterinsurgency more effectively have weighed in on how blood feuds really do end.  A 
question for them then is: do blood feuds end? And, if the U.S. has not successfully dismantled non-
Western codes of conduct in places where Americans have spilled blood, couldn’t—or, more to the 
point, shouldn’t— we expect revenge?  This is a question that increasingly extends beyond Afghanistan 
and Iraq to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Iran.177 
 
How, meanwhile, does any of this relate back to the American conviction that, over the course of a 
war, we will sufficiently learn from our mistakes and, if not correct them and move on to victory, then 
at least move on—as we did after Vietnam?178 
 
Three answers. First, by not convincingly winning long wars, we teach any future or wannabe 
adversaries that they should want to embroil us in long wars.  Second, by not thinking it necessary to 
deliver a knock-out punch at the outset, we remain unprepared to go all-out from the get-go, and 
thereby undermine what would enable us to convincingly win. Third, the corollary to long wars no 
longer favoring us is that besides doing our troops no mental favors, they cause our military to get very 
good at spinning its wheels and then patting itself on the back for the distance it has traveled, as if this 




One sub-theme of this paper has been that the more confused and confusing the signals sent and 
received regarding violence—whether as a style (e.g. menace) or as an instrument (e.g. in combat)—the 
harder it will be to win wars.180   A second sub-theme has been that societal problems require societal 
solutions.  Violence is a societal problem. It is the one sure thing that, if not handled properly, 
threatens the integrity of any society, to include how those who engage in violence are handled. 
 
Essentially, two realities about us bracket a reality about them. First, menace’s appeal suffuses our 
society. Second, PTSD and the aftereffects of a decade at war are only just beginning to manifest 
themselves.  Certain things may be able to be done in the near term to mitigate both of these. But, to 
fully address either requires acknowledging that we cannot continue on our present course vis-à-vis 
non-Westerners. 
 
While there has been a re-realization, post-Afghanistan and Iraq, that we Americans cannot impel 
people elsewhere to practice good governance, many in the State Department and DoD do still believe 
that if we just continue to invest in helping people re-build their institutions we will help them stabilize 
their fragile, under-governed, and post-conflict states.  As I have written elsewhere, all aid—except for 
acute disaster relief, and un-pocketable education and training—undermines sovereignty. We only fool 
ourselves and enrich others when we send U.S. taxpayer dollars abroad in pursuit of stability and 
reconstruction.  Until non-Westerners seek our help because they share, or want to adopt, our ethics 
and values, our cajoling them to make themselves over won’t work – with one potential exception. 
There is a chance, but only a chance, that we could help make a difference through military-to-military 
assistance. 
 
To momentarily revisit the debate about which should be addressed first in the face of instability—
security or development—those who have actually succeeded in rendering terrorist threats inert are 
adamant: security must always take precedence over development.  In their view, it makes no sense to 
build on a foundation of sand; without a secure environment, whatever inputs are provided will be 
looted, coopted, or destroyed.181 My argument is complementary, but slightly different.  Because 
development is always political it feeds friction. Disputes will inevitably arise over which community 
gets what project, who will be put in charge, who will benefit, etc.  In contrast, protecting citizens and 
the integrity of a country is a potentially apolitical endeavor. Better yet, when security services are 
incorruptible, state subversion becomes virtually impossible.  Even with corrupt politicians, a flawed 
justice system, and ineffective media, if members of the security services refuse to behave like thugs, 
politicians have no one in uniform to whom they can reliably turn for muscle or protection. One 
consequence, then, of having professional apolitical armed forces is to curtail politicians’ ability to 
intimidate. A second is that even if members of the public doubt they can count on the state for full 
protection, they at least know it won’t brutalize them. 
 
The significance of apolitical, uncorruptible security services cannot be overstated.  They are especially 
critical in countries with strong communal loyalties. Where extended families reign, elections amount 
to little more than demographic contests. Our version of democracy— one man/one vote—is not 
workable when people are morally (and logically) bound to vote for the individual who will best 
represent their interests: a fellow family, clan, or tribal member.  Nevertheless, just because our variant 
of democracy may not fit, does not mean that there aren’t other forms of representative government 
that would protect minority rights in the face of majority rule. The challenge is for people to devise 
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systems that no one within those systems can unfairly game, given the reality that unfairly gaming 
systems is what communal allegiances call for. 
 
For all the reasons described in this paper, and because we do not sufficiently appreciate (or 
particularly respect) non-Western values, it would be prudent for us to desist from advising non-
Westerners about anything related to governance in the future. Instead, if we Americans have to 
proselytize, we should shift our energies to supporting a looser but bolder principle: the separation 
between governance and politics. 
 
Governance/politics.  Imagine if, in the 21st century, there was a liberation in the non-West equivalent 
to what the separation of church and state achieved over the course of the past several centuries in the 
West. Imagine if electricity, clean water, food safety, protection from disease, physical security, and 
other essential services whose accessibility and regulation citizens need to be able to count on were 
delivered by professional civil services, while everything else was relegated to political contestation.  
This is more or less the model the world’s largest democracy successfully applies, and India is a country 
that remains riven by communal loyalties.  India has developed a federal backbone that maintains order 
despite, or in the face of, fierce sectarian politics. 
 
Clearly, in any governance/politics split, determining what should count as an essential service versus 
what politicians should get to distribute as patronage, represents a contestable challenge in and of 
itself.182 But, separating governance from politics would hardly require a singular solution.  For 
instance, what might best limit crony capitalism in the U.S. would no doubt differ from what would 
suit Zimbabwe. The only likely commonality would be that security would wind up being considered 
an essential (if not the first most important) good, if for no other reason than once one country 
develops a capable professional military, others in its region should want to develop the same (for 
prestige even more than for self-defense). 
 
Here is where we come back to the one institution the U.S. could help other countries strengthen, since 
all professional militaries share certain key features – from meritocratic personnel systems to similar 
functional specialties.183 
 
Civic action. One of the few successful post-WWII counterinsurgencies the U.S. helped wage was 
against the Huks in the Philippines during the early 1950s. Edward Lansdale, who served as an advisor 
to Minister of Defense and later President Ramon Magsaysay, credits himself with introducing ‘civic 
action’ as a term.184   What he meant by civic action was that the Philippine military needed to prove to 
Filipinos that it existed to protect rather than prey on them. Lansdale and Magsaysay used the army to 
help police free and fair elections in 1951 and 1953. They also encouraged the military to engage in 
other measures designed to earn the public’s trust, the important point being that it was the Philippines’ 
own forces that did this in the Philippines – not the U.S. military. 
 
‘Legitimacy’ has become an important watchword post-Iraq and Afghanistan.  Common sense alone 
suggests that we should never want to work with or beside a government (or insurgent force) that lacks 
legitimacy and doesn’t care about its own people.185    A simple rule of thumb should be that if we have 
to ‘teach’ others the importance of fulfilling a social contract, we are embarking on a lost cause from 
the outset.  In other words, civic action could be used as a canary in the mine: governments that don’t 
want their militaries developing a civic action capability are governments we can’t help.  As for 
assisting governments that are willing to develop a civic action capability, we should offer military-to-
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military training, but with the proviso that we and they only use the resources at hand.   
 
No question, working within such limited means would present a challenge to advisors, and civic 
action would surely not be the only mil-to-mil assistance advisors would have to be limited to assist 
with.  But it does represent an ideal test and proof of concept. 
 
It also flies in the face of arguments still being made about Vietnam— e.g., had the U.S. only done 
certain things somewhat differently we could have won.  Similar arguments are already beginning to 
echo in counterfactual quarterbacking regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, leading some to push the idea of 
a permanent advisory corps and a much more robust unconventional warfare capability.  This, 
however, ignores the second lesson to be learned from Lansdale’s example. Lansdale only ever 
operated with a small team, and did so at the highest levels. He was thus perfectly positioned to take 
the temperature of government(s) before the U.S. committed further resources. More importantly, he 
was a master of wile – and wile can hardly be supersized. 
 
Wile.  Wile requires at least four attributes: 1) the ability to identify that feature or set of features in an 
adversary’s culture that can be used as the fulcrum by, with, and through which to permanently alter 
conditions, 2) the ability to read all players so that you know how to appeal to, neutralize, and/or 
outwit each equally well, 3) an intuitive ability to tease, test, and probe so that you can make your own 
opportunities and don’t operate on others’ timeline(s), and 4) an appetite for twitting others, which 
means relishing the idea of turning the tables on adversaries in order to cause them to undo themselves. 
 
At best, the most unconventional U.S. units today strive to “screw with others’ heads,” which they can 
generally do only after commanders figure out how to wrest the right authorities from the right 
agencies and bureaucracies.186   Then, should such individuals succeed at fusing their information 
operations, psyop, strategic communications, and operator capabilities to sow dissension and distrust, 
at best they can cause problems at the tactical and operational levels: they usually don’t have the 
wherewithal to strategically coordinate beyond their area of operations.  This is why to truly “screw 
with their heads” requires that commanders be able to apply wile: a) locally, b) coordinating across 
locations and over time, and c) supralocally in order to both buy and control time. 
 
Of course, to give the military its best shot at mastering a situation so that others can’t effectively 
maneuver it, or anything else, against us – to include youth, accidental guerrillas, or public sentiment – 
calls for unrestrained warfare.187   But, given current sensibilities, this hardly appears an option.  Thus, 
seeking to “screw with others’ heads” provides one way to augment the use of force.  Or, replace it. 
 
However, we would make a massive, but classically American mistake, to assume that wile is 
something the military can either teach or train.  William Donovan and the OSS recognized how 
uncommon an attribute wile is. They also realized it was a trait that needs to be selected for, though 
today the selection techniques used during WWII (famously described in Assessment of Men) would 
need to be modified since during and immediately after WWII the OSS and other behind-the-lines 
organizations were most interested in Americans who had European rather than non-Western 
sensibilities, especially since those they sent to operate in the ‘East’ could only really do so via proxy. 
 
Not surprisingly, the idea of using proxies has attracted renewed attention in the wake of Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  The benefits are obvious: proxies would help save U.S. blood and treasure.  Plus, proxy 
forces don’t just look and sound like locals; they are locals.  However, use of proxies is far from risk-
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free. Units we train can turn rogue en masse, as the Zetas did in Mexico. Or, individuals can launch 
‘insider attacks,’ as has been occurring in Afghanistan. 
 
However, an even more profound problem is that proxies are almost never a wise choice if 
Washington’s aim is long-term stability.  Here is why: those responsible for training proxies (usually 
U.S. Special Forces) are understandably drawn to local forces who have a reputation for being effective 
fighters and natural guerrillas, especially when such groups are led by appealing and even charismatic 
leaders, and actively seek our assistance.  These are among the reasons we gravitated to the 
Montagnards and Hmong during the Vietnam War, have favored the Kurds in Iraq since the First Gulf 
War, and rode into Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance in 2001. But, regardless of how proficient 
such groups are at warfighting, which of them has been able to help us rebuild their country, or their 
country’s military?  The short answer is: none. Take the Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara, and rump Pashtun 
members of the Northern Alliance.  They were ideal military assets at the time.  But, without the 
numbers or moral authority to establish control outside of their home areas they also proved to be 
political liabilities.  This is inconvenient fact #1. Inconvenient fact #2 is that once we ally ourselves 
with groups viewed as marginal and lesser, we alienate and/or don’t sufficiently cultivate those who 
could potentially control their country—if what we seek is what we claim to seek: namely, majority 
rule.188 
 
Here, again, is where our inability to read local dynamics and/or our desire to do what seems most 
expedient actually militates against (rather than facilitates) our being able to get in and out of a 
situation quickly – a task that will only get harder as others develop their ability to use our habits and 
norms against us.  
 
In other words, we hardly have a lock on wile. 
 
Status/menace.  Non-Asian non-Westerners are bound to try to maneuver against us in the future for a 
host of different reasons, and not just because we are ‘there’ in the non-West competing against them. 
Nor will they target us just because we represent a classically convenient target gratis our being both 
foreign and Goliath-like. Surely these will remain motivators.  But so will the pursuit of status.189   Or, 
to reframe this in terms of the Clausewitzian argument that war is a contest of wills, international 
competition is bound to remain oriented as much toward proving worth as gaining wealth – 
particularly in the post-conquest 21st century, when populations can’t be overtly subjugated and 
territory can’t be openly seized. Under these circumstances, violence serves as a proxy – used to 
determine who defers and/or submits to whom, with ‘who can control what’ serving as the ultimate 
proof of deference and submission. 
 
In other words, no matter how much we might analyze wars as though they are fought for material 
ends, this is a very Western outlook.  It does not necessarily explain others’ primary motivation(s). Yes, 
gaining control may well be materially important, since money, resources, and loot are essential to 
attaining and staying in power.  But, if power is the ‘end’ being sought, and these are the ‘means,’ then 
control really only represents the material manifestation of status.  In the most ironic of all inversions, 
this doesn’t just flip our notions of war aims on their head, but makes conflict a means to a different 
(non)-end than the end we envision.190 
 
Another problem we face is that while states have more or less learned how to contend with other 
states, democracies continue to flail when confronted by non-state actors, terrorists, guerrillas, and 
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others. One reason non-state actors have proven such a problem for Western democracies is that they 
know they gain more by refusing to comply with Western rules and norms of combat.  In fact, the less 
decently non-Westerners behave, the more they ensure the world’s best armed, most capable militaries 
can’t effectively fight back, which then attains them a stature they otherwise would never receive.191 
 
Like any other set of conventions, norms of combat are all too easy to breach.  To maintain them 
generally requires that they be so morally freighted and/or tightly woven into the social fabric that 
jettisoning them jeopardizes too much.  This makes conventions akin to paradigms, which is why, 
when a clash occurs between ‘old’ and ‘new’ or competing sets of norms or paradigms—think: Western 
and non-Western conceptions of what is or is not appropriate in war—that puts the force with the 
stricter, more transparent, and better publicized code of conduct at an automatic disadvantage.192 
 
It shouldn’t be hard to see where this leads, especially since it has also become increasingly difficult for 
even outrageous acts of violence (or insult) to ignite populations – which is a good thing, I don’t mean 
to suggest otherwise.  But the downside is that as wars waged by the U.S. have come increasingly to be 
fought for interests, not national passions, the side that should win (us) has grown afraid to wipe out 
the side that should lose, while we also find it increasingly difficult to discern who is on a side thanks to 
there being no readily distinguishable impassioned mass to point to.  Ironically, while we have grown 
too sophisticated to get inflamed, they have become too sophisticated to don uniforms.  This, too, 
marks a sea change since WWII. 
 
Actually, if we were to catalog all the various forces WWII unleashed, we would likely find that from 
wars of liberation through warlordism we have allowed (and even helped enable) conflict to grow so 
existentially discomfiting that our discomfort makes it all the harder for us to regroup and recover our 
resolve, regarding either war or peace. I include peace because, as Afyare Abdi Elmi points out, peace is 
not the absence of conflict, but conflict worked out through non-violent means.193   He writes this as a 
Somali, cognizant that no single Somali clan (or clan-family) is strong enough to beat the rest, that all 
strive instead to be first among equals, and that no political arrangement will work if everyone can’t 
fight. 
 
Elmi’s observations are in keeping with the inconvenient fact that those humans who are good at 
fighting like to fight. Often they spoil to fight, which makes their fighting for spoils (or as spoilers) 
ancillary. 
 
Thus, one imperative for how to re-contain (and re-constrain) war should be to provide people some 
kind of stakes to fight over. And, though it would be Pollyanna-ish to assume that a separation 
between governance and politics alone would do the trick—particularly when violence remains the 
default path for some males, along with the women their menace attracts—it could at least siphon off 
some energy.  So could what should be the second 21st century separation worth contemplating: how to 
split menace from status, especially since this combination represents the most dangerous shortcut to 
power there is.  At the very least, menace’s imagery needs to be overhauled. One way to do this would 
be to put menace in uniform and keep it under hierarchical control (via national service, for instance).  
That is what gerontocracies did.  Of course, classic gerontocracies also managed to control young 
women in ways that aren’t possible today, although reorienting young women to more responsible 
males can surely still be done—at least in theory.194   The catch is accomplishing any of this requires 
society’s participation.  Unfortunately, without society, the best the military can strive for is to get 
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not just because of its alleged complicity in hiding senior AQ members, but because we have been working closely 
with the Pakistani army off and on for decades. Partnerships—if partnering with others is to be the sine qua non 
of our security arrangements going forward—clearly need to be based on something different than they have been 
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and those who are increasingly dismissive of fellow officers who claim to be suffering from it. As for casualty-
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28 Members of society either internalize their code of conduct or they look to those in authority to establish and 
police this for them. 
 
29 This does not just include alpha males (or alpha females). Often, non-alphas may be even more disruptive 
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se. 
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their own reality, these are individuals who can surely tell the difference between live fire and dry fire exercises. 
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200 articles and 10 books, or the quarterback whose team entertains tens of millions every weekend, or the 
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41 Not a ‘happy’ by-product if you are skeptical of cloning, stem cell research, etc. 
 
42 Here I refer to ‘solvent’ in the chemical sense, as in a ‘liquid[ity] capable of dissolving another substance.’ 
 
43 In many societies, still, it is considered taboo to use money acquired through nefarious means for certain kinds 
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Commodities (American Anthropological Association monograph, 1989). 
 
44 We see at least three untoward effects: 1) violence gets turned inward against members of one’s own 
community; 2) some begin to experiment with ever edgier violence; and 3) organizations or individuals involved in 
crime (or subversion) have an easier time recruiting thugs—“join us and you’ll earn status even faster.” 
 
Alternatively, think gangs and how they ‘jump in’ new members; think rapes and impalements, or ‘short sleeve’ or 
‘long sleeve’ amputations in Sierra Leone; or think about who warlords, to include sitting presidents (from the late 
Slobodan Milosevic to Omar al-Bashir and Robert Mugabe), have used to do their dirty work for them. 
 
45 Caitlin Flanagan, in a book review, comments that Anita Shreve “writes boldly about the ways that male 
adolescence differs from female, especially in the way that boys suddenly become so much larger and stronger 
than girls, lending every sexual encounter the potential for menace and domination. As [one of her male 
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the way the male held himself’” (“Love, Actually: How Girls Reluctantly Endure the Hookup Culture,” The 
Atlantic, June 2010, p. 95). 
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2011. 
 
48 Youth seldom sufficiently appreciate that impressions made when they are young can stick. This is one 
downside to no longer living in extended families, where bad social actors serve as objects of withering 
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commentary and thus as object lessons for how not to behave. Another irony worth remarking is that just as 
adolescents finally feel their identity is theirs to shape, others (peers especially) will begin to lock them in to the 
identity they project. 
 
In a Wall Street Journal weekend interview (December 31, 2011), Jalen Rose (of the Leadership Academy in 
Northwest Detroit) said: “’I feel like the eight most at-risk years for young men or young women are the four 
they’re in high school and the four they should be in college. You ask any adult whose dreams didn’t come true or 
goals they didn’t get accomplished, they point back to that eight-year period when they started driving, their 
hormones started taking over, they started having sex, they started partying… That’s when you’re in a position to 
make those poor decisions and actually execute them. That’s why I really wanted to influence this age group.’” 
 
49 It also can depend on upbringing and personality, but not necessarily in predicable ways, which is what makes 
determining who is most at-risk so difficult. Who matters by way of a preferred audience can often change as 
individuals mature. 
 
50 Two exceptions are: some child soldiers, and sex workers trafficked without their consent. 
 
51 This may change with the state of the economy. 
 
52 Tellingly, for all the attention computer geeks are thought to get today, the geeks who matter are geeks who 
‘run’ something, and have a bank account and/or the subordinates to prove their worth. 
 
53 The HBO television series The Wire featured boxing. 
 
54 James Howell, “Gang Prevention: An Overview of Research and Programs,” Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, December 2010, pp 15-16. 
 
55 Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism 
(London: Demos, 2010) , p. 13. 
 
56 Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists (Ecco, 2010), pp. 290-
1. 
 
57 Colonel John M. Venhaus, “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,” USIP Special Report, May 2010, p. 11. Or as Venhaus 
notes, youth should be provided “with more choices and alternative definitions that allow them to find productive 
and positive self-definition” (emphasis added). 
 
58 Ibid, p. 13. 
 
59 It seems exceedingly ironic that while hazing and bullying are increasingly condemned, menace remains so 
widely broadcast. Alternatively, perhaps nothing better epitomizes the mixed messages being sent (and received) 
by adolescents today than the sports figure-as-role-model debate, a debate that recurs whenever players in the U.S. 
are caught engaging in inappropriate or illicit behavior off the field. The questions invariably asked in the wake 
of such scandals are whether role models should have to live up to higher standards: just because someone swings 
a club or bat well, makes lots of money, and youth look up to him, why should he have to live like a saint? 
Curiously, what no one counters with is that there are global figures who everyone can agree do project 
indisputable moral character – Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama, for example. No athlete points to them and 
says they should be the only individuals kids are raised to emulate. 
 
But even if all of the sports world’s greats did say this, it wouldn’t matter. Not when athletes remain a money- 
making center of attention and we lack a clear hierarchy of statuses. A second reason: at the same time it has 
become harder to hide bad behavior, thereby making it easier for others to expose your transgressions, the 
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penalties for getting caught have also become less severe. 
 
We’ll probably never know whether the rate of bad behavior is higher among today’s ‘elite,’ but illegitimate 
behavior is certainly more easily legitimized than ever before. It is as if, minus a few exceptions (e.g. child 
molestation), the more illicit acts high profile members of society openly engage in (e.g. drugs, alcohol, buying 
sex), the fewer the long term consequences of getting caught for anything. 
 
With scandal itself a source of fame, why should young people gravitate toward only good behavior? 
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populations that have never been included, but have been chronically marginalized and treated as though their 
members are second class, are likely to be less skilled at leading social movements than people(s) who were 
somebodies or were on their way to becoming somebodies when that status was wrenched away. (Of course, 
whether the disenfranchised are those who were formerly enfranchised and the alienated are those who have never 
been included, or whether the terms and definitions should be reversed, is debatable. The important point is to 
distinguish between people who haven’t been included within living memory vs. those who have been willfully 
demoted, and cast out or aside.) 
 
62 Actually, one could fill a paragraph with examples. For instance, Sir John Philby (father of Kim Philby), 
embittered by his treatment in the British Civil Service, is the man said to be responsible for the U.S., not Britain, 
acquiring access to Saudi oil. Military examples would have to include Douglas MacArthur and his quest to 
retake the Philippines and Joseph Stilwell and his quest to retake Burma. 
 
63 Aminatta Forna, Ancestor Stones (Grove Press, 2007), p. 296 
 




65 Peter Godwin, The Fear: Robert Mugabe and the Martyrdom of Zimbabwe (Back Bay Books, 2011), p. 293. 
 
66 Eva Hoffman, Lost in Translation: A Life in a New Language (Penguin, 1990) p. 124. 
 
67 Or, their threat about the use of force has to be credible. 
 
68 Karl Marlantes, What It Is Like to Go to War (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011), p. 243. 
 
69 Which represents a twist on the arguments about gratuitous cruelty Daniel Goldhagen makes in Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (Knopf, 1996). In Goldhagen’s view, gratuitous cruelty 
grows out of eliminationist attitudes toward specific categories of others. 
 
70 Nicholas Schmidle, To Live or to Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years in Pakistan (Henry Holt, 2009), p. 
201, emphasis mine. 
 




72 Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt) was a master at this. 
 
73 Which may help explain the wars between Rwanda and Uganda in DRC, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 
both cases, who helped whom attain autonomy festered into bad blood. 
 
74 As Robert Merry writes, “In his book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman calls America ‘the 
ultimate benign hegemon.’ But if there are lessons in history, certainly one teaches that there is no such thing as a 
benign hegemon. Hegemonic ambition inevitably inserts the hegemon into environments that turn out to be 
threatening, brutal, and savage. And then, if it wants to remain a hegemon, it can no longer be benign” (Sands of 
Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition [Simon & Schuster, 
2005], p. 221). 
 
75 By this I mean shared religion, tribal bonds, nationalism, ethnicity, and so on. Or, as Abdulkadir Sinno points 
out, “The Taliban was able to co-opt or sideline many entrenched and hardened Pushtun [sic] local leaders by 1) 
undermining the leaders’ support through a vision that appealed to their followers, 2) making effective use of their 
specialized knowledge of the Pushtun power tapestry and sophisticated strategies to sideline opposition at little 
cost, and 3) benefiting from their own momentum to increase their appeal to local leaders and their followers” 
(Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond [Cornell University Press, 2009], pp. 236-7). 
 
76 Andrew Alderson, Bankrolling Basra (Constable and Robinson, 2007], p. 186. 
 
77 The reason I write ‘conceptually’ is because at the tactical and operational levels there are members of the 
military who can code-switch and do appreciate how sophisticated non-Westerners can be. 
 
78 Patrick Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (Zed Books, 2009), p 74. 
 
79 Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa 
(PublicAffairs, 2011), p. 313. 
 
80 See Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, This Child Will Be Great: Memoir of a Remarkable Life by Africa’s First Woman 
President (Harper Perennial, 2010). 
 
81 The same argument was made about Bosnian leader, Alija Izetbegovic re: Srebenica and other “safe zones” (see 
the documentary, “The Death of Yugoslavia”). 
 
82 Stearns, p. 315. 
 
83 Schmidle, p. 62. 
 
84 Ibid, p. 132. 
 
85 Stewart, p. 265. 
 
86 Alderson, pp. 56-7. 
 




89 William Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
47 | FPRI
90 Virtually all relationships are asymmetric. This is why terms like ‘asymmetric warfare’ are misleading. As 
Richard Rumelt notes, “No one has an advantage at everything. Teams, organizations, and even nations have 
advantages in certain kinds of rivalry under particular conditions. The secret to using advantage is understanding 
this particularity” (p. 161). 
 
91 True cynics would now likely contend that Museveni must be benefitting more from whatever the U.S. is giving 
him as we try to capture/kill Joseph Kony than he profits from Joseph Kony roaming through the CAR and 
Congo, or wherever outside of Uganda the LRA might be. Again, the fact that Museveni’s critics believe the LRA 
has long been beatable, but that he never destroyed, it points to their regard for his political skill. 
 
92 See Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It (Wiley, 2008). 
 
93 “The people have given this time of violence and suffering its own name… They are calling it chidudu. It 




95 Also, Godwin makes the point that the MDC has not taken up arms—so the UN has no reason to intervene 
 
96 Ibid, p. 25. This is actually a tried and true practice, very reminiscent of Mobutu Sese Seko’s command to 
Zairois to “debrouillez-vous”—essentially, fend for yourselves. 
 
97 In reality, a good number of white farmers emigrated to Zimbabwe after Mugabe took office in 1980. 
 
98 For a somewhat different kind of case, consider MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), 
which began as a PR-savvy effort to stand up for the Delta’s peoples and credibly represent “the grievances of the 
local population against government corruption, environmental degradation, and perceived mismanagement of oil 
revenues”[http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-World-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Movement-for-the- 
Emancipation-of-the-Niger-Delta-MEND-Nigeria.html (retrieved 7/13/12)]. Some claim MEND is just another 
front for thugs – but an exceptionally media-savvy one. 
 
For this paper’s purposes, what is interesting about MEND is less its purposely decentralized structure or its 
ability to code switch between village level and boardroom level politics—e.g. “As Dokubo-Asari stated in an 
interview with Sahara Reporters in 2007, ‘MEND was created not as an organisation but as a name for the 
purpose of issuing unified statements’” (ibid). Instead, what is worthy of attention is how skilled MEND has 
proved to be at presenting itself as a cutting edge ‘organization,’ while actually accomplishing very little. In 
describing it, website entries use all the latest COIN jargon. The fact that MEND has been able to convince 
certain COIN ‘experts’ that it represents the cutting edge of asymmetric warfare is the true triumph, since this 
legitimization earns it a cachet few other groups can match. This means that in MEND’s case it may not just be 
elements within the Nigerian government (and defense forces) that have their own reasons for treating MEND as 
a menace, and allowing it to remain one; MEND’s seeming fulfillment of some experts’ predictions about the 
direction hybrid or 4th generation suggests an even grander inadvertent collusion. 
 
99 To include non-Westerners’ use of Western practices – like internet and phishing scams, which Nigerians now 
excel at. No account better explores how, with what flair, why, and with so little remorse Nigerians engage in 419 
scams than Adaobi Nwaubani’s novel, I Do Not Come To You By Chance (Hyperion, 2009). 
 
100 Piracy also isn’t conflict per se, but a by-product of opportunity. Thanks to the fact there is no one onshore to 
stop them, Somali pirates can take advantage of a target rich opportunity offshore. Interestingly, recent reports 




101 Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (Random House, 2008), p. 281. 
 
102 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/world/asia/02taliban.html?_r=1 (accessed 7/17/12). 
 
103 Nour Malas, “Syria Revolt Fueled by Roof Fires and Tweets,” Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2011. The more 
people turn customary practices into code, the harder a time authorities will have separating signals from noise. 
And then, even if they can do so, that only leads to the next challenge: separating the guilty from the non-guilty 
without trammeling on the latters’ rights. 
 
104 Daniel Klaidman and Christopher Dickey, “The Body Bomb,” Newsweek, May 21, 2012. 
 
105 Consider this twist: there are reports that a female member of Ansar al-Sunna, an AQ-affiliated group 
purposely had women raped so that she could then recruit them to join the jihad. The recruitment pitch was that 
joining the jihad would allow them to reclaim their purity. Rape was also allegedly used as a recruiting tool by 
the LTTE (“Evolution of the Global Jihad: Women in the Insurgency in Iraq” ms. submitted to Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, 2012). 
 
106 This is yet another reason why current plans to increasingly rely on proxy forces in the future are problematic. 
See the Conclusion for more. 
 
As of August 10, 2012, there were at least 22 attacks “in which Afghan forces or insurgents disguised in Afghan 
uniforms have turned their guns on international troops” according to an Associated Press tally. 
 
107 Tamim Ansary’s grandmother did this in Afghanistan in the 1950s (West of Kabul, East of New York: An 
Afghan American Story [Picador 2003]). 
 
More recently, during the Liberian Civil War “it was important for the family to have a ‘big man’ in the rebel 
movement around so that their estate and property would not be looted and ravaged. It was therefore good to 
have at least one son join the military, or at least to be related to people with important posts in a particular rebel 
movement. It was even better if one of the daughters was having a relationship with a local commando” (Mats 
Utas, Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War, Uppsala University Dissertations in Cultural 
Anthropology, 2003, p. 177). 
 
108 Change the references to Sudan in the following, and Alex de Waal could be describing Afghanistan: “Politics is 
ordinary in a striking way: the ‘big men’ in power in Khartoum and the ‘little men’ with only local authority 
behave in much the same way, following the same logic of securing their positions whether to control a village or 
a country. At every level, every institution from the village or lineage to the presidency is factionalized, to the 
extent that this can be seen as the defining feature of Sudanese politics—elsewhere I have called Sudan the 
‘turbulent state.’ It is hard to separate the ‘customary’ and the ‘modern,’ despite the efforts of a prior generation 
of Sudanese political scientists and activists: the ‘native administration’ and the ‘modern administration’ are 
mutually assimilated. It is common to find that in a single prominent provincial family, one son is the chief of the 
tribe, and his brothers or first cousins will include an army general, a commissioner, a senior party member, a 
businessman and a professor—and also today a senior NGO or UN official. If the family is placed at a 
particularly strategic political intersection, brothers may hold high ranks in different competing parties, and 
perhaps one will also be an influential member of an armed opposition movement” (Alex de Waal, “Vernacular 
Politics in Africa (1),” http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2009/09/28/vernacular-politics-in-africa-1, accessed 2/12/2010). 
 
109 This dynamic, writ large, also explains much about U.S.-Pakistani relations.  Arguably, even we hedge our 
bets – but just in different ways, to different ends, and we call it ‘balance’ when we do. If we weren’t hedging, we 
would choose the factions we want to side with abroad at the start of every ‘battle,’ whether in politics or in war.  
In South Asia this means we would side either with India or with Pakistan. 
 
110 Of course, we also have differences with our closest Western allies—e.g., over capital punishment. 
49 | FPRI
 
111 This is underscored by religious beliefs many places, where gods don’t represent or mete out anything 
approaching ‘justice.’ In fact, the correlation would seem to be that Judeo-Christian and even Muslim 
conceptions of justice have everything to do with a single God; all other gods have ‘trickster’-like qualities. 
 
112 Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles (PublicAffairs 2009), p. 29. 
 
113 Ibid, p. 82. 
 
Is Russia Western or non-Western? In late June 2012, The Economist’s ‘Schumpeter’ wrote: “In private a striking 
number of businesspeople admitted to embarrassment about Mr. Putin’s return to the presidency… But when Mr. 
Putin turned up to deliver his speech the delegates, Westerners included, were transformed into slavering 
sycophants. The hall was packed – the bigwigs up front and their underlings at the back” (June 30, 2012, p. 70). 
 
114 A psyop Saddam Hussein also used re: WMD, but which proved him too clever by half. 
 
115 Leaders who can keep their rivals and citizens guessing, intimidated, and/or cowed clearly have a facility for 
juggling numerous balls. The fact they do this without having to resort to daily polls and focus groups means they 
also have an intuitive knack for politicking. 
 
116 Douglas Rogers, The Last Resort: A Memoir of Mischief and Mayhem on a Family Farm in Africa (Three 
Rivers Press, 2010) p. 238. 
 
117 Nor do they have to worry about one of their own betraying them. This can change, of course, under duress. 
But for anyone who benefits from being part of, or close to, the ruling circle there should be no reason to 
experience duress. 
 
118 Another proof: warrior societies have rarely if ever grown gentler on their own. 
 
119 For another example of a low tech/high sophistication act: internet beheadings. In a different era this would 
have provoked members of the American public to bay for bloody—very bloody—revenge. Think: scalping. 
 
120 The pattern with ‘first contacts’ of previously undiscovered ‘natives’ usually consists of awe and curiosity when 
outsiders first show up. As soon as it becomes clear the visitors aren’t gods, spirits, aliens, or super-human, locals 
begin angling for advantage and/or they turn hostile. Think Captain Cook on his third visit to Hawaii; he was 
killed. Or see the documentary “First Contact.” 
 
121 I use ‘participation’ rather than support because support implies being amenable to our presence, and that is 
hardly sufficient. Government forces have to actively seek to beat insurgents in order to win. 
 
122 Karl Marlantes in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (“The Truth About Being a Hero,” August 20, 2011) 
suggests that war is about getting through to the other side. He’s talking physically, in terms of the objective. My 
point is that his observation is far more profound than he realizes, especially when one considers that getting 
through ‘to the other side’ has become, in all senses, more difficult given the unclear nature of ‘sides,’ and the 
referent ‘to.’ 
 
123 Arguably, every war scars a generation in its own way; it is only post-WWII we have had the luxury of 
focusing—or talking about how we need to focus—on remedies. 
 
124 Korea is unresolved but delineated. 
 
125 Again, too, through WWII we declared war. But for that argument (again) see The Sovereignty Solution. 
 
50 | FPRI
126 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy 
During the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2005), as well as Barry Goldwater, With No Apologies: The 
Personal and Political Memoirs of United States Senator Barry M. Goldwater (William & Morrow, 1979). Or, for 
Lemay: “LeMay’s theory of war—his doctrine—in its most simplified form came down to this: a nation should 
think long and hard before it makes the fateful decision to go to war. But once that decision is made, then that 
nation should be willing to hit the enemy with every conceivable weapon at its disposal to end the conflict as 
quickly as possible. If a nation is not willing to do that, it should not go to war in the first place” (Warren Kozak, 
LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay [Regnery, 2009], pp 96-7). 
 
The Sovereignty Solution makes a similar argument except we eschew the use of nuclear weapons. Notably, the 
Weinberger Doctrine also aligns with this view. The Powell Doctrine does not, since having to have an exit 
strategy suggests that you intend to do either more (such as nation-build and stabilize) or less (such as negotiate) 
than incontrovertibly defeat and dictate terms to your named enemy. 
 
127 Just being realistic, maybe you can’t single out your foes. Maybe they are too few and too burrowed into the 
population—or too powerful. Maybe the costs of collateral damage appear too high. Or maybe you don’t have 
the stomach for large numbers of casualties. But if any of these are the case, then #3 can’t hold: you clearly don’t 
consider the cause sufficiently existential. 
 
128 Nancy Sherman, The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers (W.W. Norton, 2010), 
p. 77, emphasis mine. 
 
129 At least not in most Americans’ eyes, while our one post-World War existential struggle never did involve 
direct combat between us and the Soviets. 
 
130 A critical caveat is in order regarding TBIs, whose effects are not yet fully understood. If most PTSD can be 
linked to TBIs, and there is a somatic cause for mental health problems, then what I describe in the text will need 
to be amended. Society won’t just be responsible for understanding what combat demands, but will be 
responsible for ensuring that fewer combatants suffer TBIs by redressing how we wage war – something that 
could be achieved by sending fewer troops patrolling up and down roads and by more pummeling via artillery and 
air. 
 
131 Caveat: since completing my paper, reviews of a new novel, Kevin Powers’ The Yellow Birds, suggest that it is 
this generation’s breakthrough novel. 
 
132 “Before Sandhurst the joke was that they gave you the Bible and Stalingrad to read and told you that only the 
latter was important. All they should have given anyone was Michael Herr’s Despatches [sic], which, quite apart 
from being the best writing on war, period, was probably as culturally influential as anything written in the 
second half of the twentieth century” (Patrick Hennessy, The Junior Officers’ Reading Club: Killing Time and 
Fighting Wars [Allen Lane, 2009], p. 238). 
 
133 It may have been forever thus, with every era shaped by expectations conveyed via images, literature, 
memorials, storytelling, or by what Martin Van Creveld refers to as a society’s ‘culture of war’ (in his book of the 
same name). 
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the outcome. As a soldier, the thing you were most scared of was failing your brothers when they needed you, and 
compared to that, dying was easy. Dying was over with. Cowardice lingered forever.” (War [Twelve, 2010], p. 
210). 
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you, but the shared commitment to safeguard one another’s lives is unnegotiable and only deepens with time” (p. 
239). 
 
136 Or arguably even before the fact—a la Major Nidal Malik Hasan at Ft. Hood. 
 




139 Rusty Bradley, Lions of Kandahar: The Story of a Fight Against All Odds (Bantam, 2011), p. 211. 
 
140 Marlantes, What It Is Like to Go to War, p. 64. 
 
141 Ibid, p. 160. 
 
142 George MacDonald Fraser, Quartered Safe Out Here: A Harrowing Tale of World War II (Skyhorse, 2007, 3rd 
ed.), pp. 89-90. 
 
143 Of course, too, those who write memoirs enter into a status competition of sorts—whether consciously or by 
default (as a by-product of writing-as-catharsis). 
 
144 Being British would have made him feel more attenuated since England wasn’t attacked on 9/11. Nonetheless, 
London was targeted in July 2005. 
 
145 As Tracy Kidder puts it (writing 30 years after his non-combat Vietnam experience), “I’m sure that many set 
out for Vietnam feeling confused or unhappy, as adolescents tend to do, and deep down many probably thought 
they would return with improved reasons for feeling that way. But of the roughly three million Americans who 
went to the war dressed as soldiers, only a small minority returned with Combat Infantryman’s Badges, certain 
proof of a terrible experience. Imagine all the bullshit stories Vietnam inspired” (My Detachment: A Memoir 
[Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006], p. 8). 
 
146 Caveat: Hennessy has a newly released book (September 2012), Kandak: Fighting with Afghans, not yet 
available in the U.S. 
 
147 “The health and survival of service members hinges on the removal of the stigma associated with mental health 
care… Military leaders recognize the importance of removing this stigma… DOD leaders at the highest levels 
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149 Robert Goldich puts it somewhat differently: “The U.S. military has become the shield behind which civilian 
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civilian society and do not wish to live within many of its central boundaries. There appears to be a gap—if not a 
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results-oriented, and emotionally extreme military, for career and non-career personnel alike.” I believe Goldich 
overstates the emotional divide; otherwise, members of the military wouldn’t be as conflicted as they are 
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153 The randomness of death is surely another factor: “The enemy now had a weapon that unnerved the 
Americans more than small-arms fire ever could: random luck. Every time you drove down the road you were 
engaged in a twisted existential exercise where each moment was the only proof you’d ever have that you hadn’t 
been blown up the moment before… Good soldiers died just as easily as sloppy ones, which is pretty much how 
soldiers define unfair tactics” (Junger, p. 142). But while ‘new’ to this generation, the unfair luck Junger describes 
is as old as war. 
 
154 Often, too, today’s combatants on the ground are saved by close air support and continuous resupply of 
prodigious amounts of ammunition – which also help make firefights one-sided in terms of who will win, leading 
(again) to discomfiting questions about what so many ‘wins’ add up to. In The Unforgiving Minute Craig 
Mullaney describes a mind-boggling number of assets – to include Apache helicopters and an A-10—used to 
inflict a relatively small number of casualties. The battle damage from his final firefight: three enemy dead. 
 
155 An exception might be Israel, post-1982 and the invasion of Lebanon. 
 
156 Fraser, p. 222. 
 
157 Again, this may not be new. But being encouraged to indulge in paying attention to feelings is. 
 
158 David Philipps, Lethal Warriors: When the New Band of Brothers Came Home (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 
68. 
 
159 Hennessy, p. 310. 
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Here, meanwhile, is another reader’s overall assessment of Hennessy’s book: “So far, so canonical. Yet his tale's 
true originality lies in Hennessey's media-saturated reflections on media-shaped campaigns. Here, postmodernism 
dons desert fatigues. These kids act like a band of brothers in part because they watch Band of Brothers. Prior to 
one encounter, they prime themselves with the supremely silly Spartans-vs.-Persians anime, 300. As for their video 
montages of real skirmishes, ‘the work of a few hours’ on standard laptop software, they have ‘changed the way 
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soldiers went to war’. When it comes to the soundtrack to Basra, forget Vietnam-era rock: ‘the rampant 
consumerism of gangsta rap struck a chord with our little oil war’.  No surprise that hard-core action in Helmand 
first "felt more like being on set than real life" (http://www.independent.co.uk/arts- 
entertainment/books/reviews/the-junior-officers-reading-club-by-patrick-hennessey-1719368.html, accessed 
August 11, 2012). 
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his bracelet during a 2008 Presidential debate, and had to look down to read it off his wrist, a Special Forces 
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as a combat stress casualty: “I’m scared of what you might do.” “You know I’d never hurt you,” he’d said, and 
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what if she’s right? What if I snap someday?” (p. 188). 
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2012) 
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October 2011. 
 
167 Calling everyone in uniform a ‘warfighter’ is symptomatic of just how conflicted even the military has become 
over how to validate what some—or all?—members do. 
 
168 When describing Marine advisers, all of whom were volunteers for a second tour in October 2010, Bing West 
writes, “They don’t need a patriotic war or sacrifices by the public. We cannot explain why they choose the rough 
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life. They march to a different drummer. They like to fight and are highly skilled at it” (p. 253). Among West’s 
shibboleths is the enfeeblement of the warrior ethos. Yet, as both The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way 
Out of Afghanistan (Random House, 2011) and his earlier book (The Strongest Tribe) make clear, the warrior 
ethos has hardly been enfeebled; he extols grunts’ courage and love of fighting at every turn. Society, on the other 
hand, is a different matter. 
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Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. 
 
176 Unless, of course, there is cause to relieve them. 
 
177 Note: I’m only talking blood here – not whatever people believe their religious duty might demand. 
 
178 Though – have we moved on since Vietnam? That would be one impertinent question. A second would be to 
ask how many times we can afford to not win and still retain our edge? 
 
179 Or as my Sovereignty co-author, Joe McGraw, wrote in an email (July 2011): “Drone strikes can provide 
tactical success (which is parlayed into political points) and domestic support, without the risk associated in 
declaring war, or stating strategic objectives, or placing Americans in near-term risk. Unfortunately, unless our 
strategy is to piss off lots and lots of people, they have no way of achieving anything approaching successful 
attainment of ends. So drones provide the ultimate solution to sustaining the application of violence for short-
term political success with zero short-term risk of American life. Couple this with the 'no strategy' strategy of 
never stating our end game objectives, and therefore never defining success (or failure), and so never achieving 
success (or failure), and we've a perfect way to allow the application of political violence for political gain 
indefinitely.” 
 
180 Winning war and prosecuting war are two different things. 
 
181 I am alluding to India’s experiences in particular. For more, see Prem Mahedevan, The Politics of 
Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in South Asia (I.B. Taurus, 2012) and 
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Sudeep Charavrati, Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country (Penguin India, 2008). 
 
182 India’s Indian Administrative Service and its division of labor between state authorities (politically elected) and 
federal authorities (meritocratically appointed), while certainly not perfect in practice, offers a more worthwhile 
model than that of any Western country. 
 
183 One reason professional militaries are so similar is because none can afford not to be. All militaries pay close 
attention to their likeliest rivals. All, also, pay attention to militaries that do well. 
 
184 See Edward Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (Fordham University 
Press, 
1991) and Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned (Naval Institute 
Press, 2008). 
 
185 Two questions should be asked: Does the host-nation military already have a civic action capability? If not, is 
it willing to develop one? Our military should never engage in well-digging or school building itself. Nor should 
we sub-contract or outsource work to local contractors. Rather, it should always be up to other militaries to 
develop their own capabilities in-house, using their (not our) equipment. We can show them what such a 
capability consists of. But, unless there are immediate force protection issues, we should never unilaterally do 
anything. Nor should we succumb to the cosmetic ruse of simply putting a local ‘face’ on U.S.-sponsored projects. 
 
186 Based on discussions with Colonel Scott Brower in Iraq, June 2011. 
 
187 See The Sovereignty Solution for more on this argument. 
 
188 Which isn’t to say we could have worked with anyone else instead. Rather, the argument is that when we side 
with minorities who are already on the outs with the majority (which is one of the reasons they gravitate to us) we 
tend to rely on them. This makes it harder for us to want to work with the majority who, typically, aren’t as 
likable because:  a) they don’t need us as much as minorities do, b) they’re more corrupt and more complacent 
about the status quo, and/or c) they aren’t as interested in fighting. or fighting beside us. 
 
189 Or, as Richard Betts suggests in a review essay of two recent books by Francis Fukuyama and John 
Mearsheimer: “…. [Fukuyama] worries that economic plenty and technological comforts are not enough to keep 
history ended, because “man is not simply an economic animal.” The real story is the moral one, the struggle for 
recognition. Fukuyama frets that Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power – that people strive to be not just equal but 
superior will reignite the impulses to violence that the end of history was supposed to put to rest… This spiritual 
dimension gives power to nationalism (which Mearsheimer sees as a major engine of international conflict) and 
religion (which Huntington sees as the most underestimated motivating force in politics” (“Conflict or 
Cooperation? Three Visions Revisited,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, p. 191. 
 
190 Just think about Iran, and all the ways in which that regime’s war posturing advantages it domestically and 
internationally. 
 
191 This isn’t just true of us, but of NATO and other Coalition forces that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
192 Or, as Theo Farrell describes them, norms double as both moral codes and technical scripts for war (The 
Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict [Lynne Rienner, 2005]). 
 
193 Afyari Abdi Elmi, Understanding the Somali Conflagration (Pluto Press, 2010), p. 12. 
 
194 This is actually the obverse of how female genital mutilation is likely to end: which will be up to males, and 
young males in particular who, the more they choose their wives in love matches (vs. arranged marriages) the 
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more adamant they are about wanting to not cause them any pain. Similarly, young women could put a stop to 
gangsta behavior if only their interests could be redirected. 
 
195 Irony of ironies, military members are intimately familiar with the significance of status and deference, what 
people will be willing to do (and sacrifice) to attain either, what some will do to undermine those whom they 
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